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Mental Disorder and Criminal Justice
Stephen J. Morse*
The criminal law treats some people with severe mental
disorders differently at every stage of the criminal process
and such people often have special needs in the system. After
providing legally relevant background information about mental
disorders and data about the prevalence of mental disorders
among inmates and their special needs, this chapter considers
doctrinal and practical reforms related to mental disorder at
every step of the criminal justice process. The goal is to suggest
how people with severe mental disorders can be treated more
humanely by the criminal justice system without compromising
the system’s retributive and crime-prevention functions.

*
Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology and Law in
Psychiatry, and Associate Director of the Center for Neuroscience & Society, University of
Pennsylvania. Professor Morse is both a lawyer and a board certified forensic psychologist. He wishes
to thank Richard Bonnie, John Monahan, Chris Slobogin, and Ed Greenlee for invaluable help.

251

252

Reforming Criminal Justice
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction...................................................................................................... 253
I. Mental Disorders Background...................................................................... 254
II. Mental Disorder Among Criminal Justice Inmates:
Prevalence and Needs............................................................................... 262
III. Doctrinal and Practice Reforms................................................................. 267
A. Criminalization of Mental Disorder........................................................ 267
B. Forensic Evaluation and The Right to A Mental Health Expert............... 269
C. Competence to Stand Trial....................................................................... 275
D. Competence to Plead and to Waive Counsel............................................ 281
E. The Right to Proceed Pro Se..................................................................... 282
F. Negating Mens Rea................................................................................... 284
G. Legal Insanity........................................................................................... 289
H. “Guilty But Partially Responsible”........................................................... 299
I. Forcible Medication and Transfer to Hospital........................................... 302
J. Sentencing.................................................................................................. 303
K. Competence to be Executed and Forcible Restoration of Competence...... 308
L. Mentally Abnormal Sexual Predator Commitment................................. 313
M. Commitment After Acquittal By Reason of Insanity............................... 320
N. Expert Testimony..................................................................................... 324
IV. Conclusion................................................................................................... 325
Recommendations............................................................................................ 325

Mental Disorder and Criminal Justice

253

INTRODUCTION
The criminal law treats some people with severe mental disorders doctrinally
and practically differently at virtually every stage of the criminal justice process,
beginning with potential incompetence to stand trial and ending with the
question of competence to be executed. Such people may also have special needs
when they are in the system. This chapter begins by exploring the fundamental
mental-health information necessary to make informed judgements about
how the criminal justice system should respond to this population, including
discussion of the causal relation between mental disorder and criminal behavior.
The next section addresses the prevalence of mental disorders in jails and
prisons and the mental-health needs of mentally disabled inmates. The third
section addresses criminal mental-health law doctrines. Throughout, the chapter
considers how changes could promote greater justice and humanity in the
law’s treatment of criminal offenders who suffer from mental disorders. A brief
conclusion follows. Specific recommendations are made in bold and a complete
list of those recommendations is found at the end of the chapter. Less important
recommendations are discussed, but are not separately made in bold.
This chapter is different from most of the others in this report. Rather
than addressing a discrete topic within criminal justice, it discusses the role of
mental disorder throughout the entire criminal justice system. It is therefore
necessarily considerably longer than almost all the other chapters. Readers
will have different interests, so a table of contents was provided to permit easy
access to those sections that a particular reader might find most relevant.
A final preliminary matter is that the American Bar Association has recently
adopted its fourth edition of Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards.1 Like
this chapter, it addresses the entire criminal justice process. Readers interested in
the issues this chapter discusses should also read the ABA Standards. Although
there are many areas of agreement, there are also areas of disagreement and the
argument and scope of analysis offered differ.
RECOMMENDATION: Readers interested in the role of mental disorder
in the criminal justice system should consult the ABA Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards.
1.
Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards (4th ed. 2016), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/mental_health_
standards_2016.authcheckdam.pdf. The current version replaces standards adopted in 1984.
Professor Christopher Slobogin, who was chair of the ABA task force charged with revising
the standards, has provided a particularly informative review of the 4th edition. Christopher
Slobogin, The American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards: Revisions for
the Twenty-First Century, 44 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1 (2016).
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I. MENTAL DISORDERS BACKGROUND

Mental disorders encompass both mental disorder and intellectual disability
(intellectual developmental disorder). Both are included in the American
Psychiatric Association’s, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fifth Edition—DSM-5.2 No consensual generic definition of mental disorder
exists, however. Here is the definition DSM-5 provides:
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically
significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion
regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying
mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated with
significant distress in social, occupational, or other important
activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a
common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a
mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious,
or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual
and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict
results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above.3
Like the previous definitions earlier editions of DSM used, this one has been
quite controversial. It should be apparent that it is not precise. On the other hand,
the lack of a good general definition does not mean that the work of classifying
mental disorders cannot be done. The question, to which we will return, is how
scientifically sound and clinically useful the classification system is.
There are a number of important considerations about mental disorder
that law reformers should understand. Diagnosis is based virtually entirely and
in most cases entirely on behavioral criteria, defined here broadly to include
cognitions (thoughts, beliefs), feelings, perceptions, desires, and actions. There
is no external standard, such as a biological or psychological marker, to which
the diagnostician can appeal to determine if the diagnosis is accurate. The
mark of accuracy is whether two independent diagnosticians can agree on the
diagnosis, which is called inter-rater reliability and which can be expressed
numerically after correcting for chance agreement. Current diagnostic
categories vary in their reliability, but, based on relatively rigorous field testing
2.
Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th
ed. 2013) (DSM-5). Intellectual Disability was formerly termed “mental retardation” and then
“developmental disorder.” The bulk of the manual addresses mental disorder and this type of
disability is far more prevalent in the population than intellectual disability.
3.
Id. at 20.
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of the categories, they are typically much higher than the reliability of DSMII categories published in 1968. Reliability has not increased much since the
publication of DSM-III in 1980, however.
Few clinicians in any setting seek an independent confirmation of their
diagnosis, so the actual reliability of diagnoses in the hurly-burly of everyday
practice is not clear. In research, investigators often use rating scales that may
be more or less structured and that typically have known reliabilities. When
judging the reliability of an individual assessment or a large-scale study, say, of
the prevalence of mental disorder in a prison population, it is always useful to
ask about the reliability of the evaluation method used to make the diagnoses.
An unreliable diagnosis warrants extreme caution.
Even if a diagnosis is reliable, a further question is whether the category is
valid. Validity refers to whether the category is a genuine and meaningful one.
In the area of diagnostic categories, the issue is whether “nature is carved at
the joints” as the categories describe or are the categories simply definitional.
For example, I can define a cluster of strong personal preferences as the
Brahms-Broncos-Bacon syndrome that applies to those people who express
strong positive preference for the composer, football team and food. I assume
one could reliably identify people as having B-B-B syndrome, but would they
be alike in any other meaningful way? In mental health, a category may be
meaningfully distinct if it has, for example, different genetic bases, different
family histories, different treatment responses, and different neural correlates
compared to other disorders. At present, the validity data for most diagnostic
categories is considerably weaker than the reliability data, and there is much
reason to believe that the allegedly discrete disorders may not be genuinely
different (except definitionally).4 For purposes of further discussion, however,
I will bracket reliability and validity concerns.
Even if two people are reliably diagnosed with the same disorder, their
behavioral presentations can be markedly different because the behaviors
that will justify a discrete diagnosis can be remarkably heterogeneous. This is
part of the reason why diagnostic reliability can be fraught. For the law, this
is a crucial point. Criminal law criteria are acts and mental states—hold aside
circumstances elements, which often themselves require an accompanying
mental state. The behavioral heterogeneity of diagnoses means that a diagnosis
4.
For example, a recent review of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies
of various mental disorders indicates that there are no significant differences between the brain
regions that activate across the various disorders. Emma Sprooten et al., Addressing Reverse
Inference in Psychiatric Neuroimaging: Meta-Analyses of Task-Related Brain Activation in Common
Mental Disorders, 38 Hum. Brain Mapping 1846 (2017).

256

Reforming Criminal Justice

cannot, per se, answer any criminal law question. One must investigate the
behavior underlying the diagnosis in order to determine if the subject’s
apparently abnormal behavior in fact meets a legal criterion. Some people with
major mental disorders are incompetent to stand trial or legally insane; most
such sufferers are neither incompetent nor legally insane. Whether a defendant
with mental disorder meets a legal criterion must be evaluated case by case
based on the subject’s behavior. For the law, behaviors speak louder than
diagnoses, psychological test data, neuroimages, or any of the array of methods
diagnosticians employ in their work.
Long ago, I proposed and still believe that many of the difficulties caused by
imprecision and controversy in mental-health concepts and categories could be
avoided by the law eschewing technical diagnostic terms and focusing instead
purely on the underlying behavior that is in any case the basis for diagnoses.5
This recommendation met with scant success. Nonetheless, law reformers
should recognize that the behaviors that justify a diagnosis make no rational
sense in context. Less serious mental disorder is less irrational; more serious
mental disorder, which is often marked by gross loss of contact with reality
(psychosis), is markedly irrational. The law is mostly concerned with people
whose mental abnormalities render them incapable of ordinary rationality in
a particular context. This is the crucial issue. A technical diagnosis answers no
legal question beyond the behavior upon which the diagnosis is based.
Before leaving the topic of diagnosis, it is important to call attention to three
diagnostic categories that are common among criminal justice defendants
and people incarcerated in jails and prisons: antisocial personality disorder,
addiction, which DSM-5 terms substance use disorders (which are individuated
according to the substance used and are characterized as “mild, moderate
or severe”) and sexual disorders. Personality disorders as a class identify
maladaptive behavior patterns that are, roughly speaking, characterological,
rather than marked by discrete cognitive, mood, or perceptual abnormalities.
Antisocial personality disorder is diagnosed based on consistent disregard for
and violation of the rights of others, as manifested by at least five of seven listed
criteria, six of which are chronically antisocial behaviors. Only one of the seven
criteria—lack of remorse—is purely psychological and need not be present
to make the diagnosis. There is a real question whether this category, which
is estimated to include 60% to 80% of inmates in secure custody, is properly
considered a type of mental disorder rather than simply a description of purely
antisocial behavior.
5.
Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law,
51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 521 (1978).
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There is a diagnostic entity seemingly similar to antisocial personality
disorder, “psychopathy,” which does include important psychological criteria,
such as lack of conscience and lack of empathy, and which can be reliably
diagnosed. It is estimated that 15% to 25% of maximum security prison
inmates have this disorder, which overlaps imperfectly with and is different
from antisocial personality disorder. Psychopathy is also the subject of an
ambitious research program in many labs, including its relation to criminal
behavior, but it is not included in DSM-5, although it seems to justify being
considered a disorder more than antisocial personality disorder.
According to DSM-5, substance abuse is diagnosed when the persistent use
of a substance causes clinically and functionally significant impairment, such as
health problems and the failure to meet major responsibilities. Many addiction
researchers in the field consider the criteria to be the persistent seeking and
using of substances despite adverse consequences and often accompanied by
subjective craving. The National Institute of Drug Abuse considers addiction to
be a chronic and relapsing brain disease, but there is a strong case that this is
an inaccurate and reductive definition and there is even dispute about whether
addiction should be considered a disorder at all. Despite such disputes, it is clear
that a very high percentage of felony arrestees test positive for various substances
and many defendants and inmates have serious problems with substance use.
Sexual disorders are marked by abnormal sexual desires that are acted on
or cause significant distress. Offenders who commit sexual crimes, such as
pedophilia, exhibitionism, and voyeurism, commonly would be diagnosed with
these disorders. Why such desires are considered the potential symptom of a
disease rather than normal human variation is an open question. Nonetheless,
the objects of some desires are considered both illegal and immoral to obtain and
thus acting on them is criminalized even though virtually no one thinks that one
“chooses” the objects of one’s sexual desire. Rather, they are typically discovered
through life experience, especially in adolescence or young adulthood.
Although antisocial personality disorder, addiction and sexual-disorder
diagnoses apply to so many criminal offenders, these disorders seldom trigger
special legal treatment. For example, none will typically be sufficient to trigger
incompetence-to-stand-trial proceedings or to be the basis for an insanity
defense. In many states, these diagnoses are specifically excluded as the potential
basis for an insanity defense. Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea
that the Constitution requires a defense for addicts whose criminal behavior is
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symptomatic of the disease of addiction.6 Rather, the government may punish
an individual for possessing or using illegal drugs, for instance, even if such
conduct is a symptom of his addiction.
The most common special treatments for these groups are non-compulsory
diversion of nonviolent defendants to specialty problem-solving courts and
special quasi-criminal commitment of so-called mentally abnormal sexually
violent predators, a practice the Supreme Court has upheld.7 In later sections
of this chapter, I shall return to whether the current legal treatment of these
three categories of disorders is wise.
The next issue of importance is the effectiveness of various treatment
methods, especially for severe mental disorder, because less severe disorders
tend not to trigger special legal treatment and do not as compellingly warrant
treatment provision. There are three primary treatment modes for people with
serious disorders: pharmacotherapy with psychotropic medication, psychological
therapy (individual and group), and psychosocial rehabilitation. The latter two
are typically more labor-intensive if done correctly, and criminal justice system
resources are limited. Consequently, for severe disorders, pharmacotherapy
is typically the treatment of first resort. Such treatments can be enormously
useful, but they are of benefit to only a moderate number of people who have
severe disorders. The usual rule is about one-third of patients improve markedly,
about one-third improve moderately, and about one-third do not improve at
all. Moreover, although they may be of help in reducing cognitive and mood
abnormalities, they do not necessarily help people with the interpersonal and
social deficits that often result from mental disorder, especially chronic disorder.
There is essentially no marker to guide clinicians in the choice of which drug
from within an appropriate class will work best. There are general guidelines,
but therapy is empirically guided in individual cases. Finally, many psychotropic
drugs have serious side effects, which explains why many patients fail to adhere
to the prescription regimen. To the extent that mood or cognitive abnormalities
render an offender incompetent at any stage in the criminal justice process,
pharmacotherapy may alone restore competence although it would be insufficient
to meet all the offender’s mental-health needs.
For the diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder, addiction, psychopathy,
and sexual disorders previously discussed, there is either no effective treatment
(antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy) for adults or the treatments
are of limited effectiveness (addiction, sexual disorders), especially with an
6.
7.

Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
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uncooperative patient. To the extent that addicts use substances as a form of selfmedication to deal with the suffering another independent disorder produces
(a case of co-morbidity), treating the other disorder may help alleviate the
addiction, but addiction tends to take on a life of its own. After unsuccessful
attempts to quit, most addicts in the general population ultimately stop using
on their own and without treatment when they have good enough reason to do
so.8 Whether the same is true of addicted inmates is unknown.
As a bridge between the issues of treatment and prediction, which will be
addressed shortly, let us consider the causal relation between mental disorder
and criminal conduct. The most important thing to recognize for lawyers and
policymakers is that mental disorders that apparently play a causal role do not
turn the person into an automaton. People with mental disorders act for reasons
just like people without such disorders. Consider Daniel M’Naghten, for example,
a 19th-century Scotsman who was delusional and believed the Tory Party was
persecuting him and was attempting to kill him. He intended to kill British Prime
Minister Robert Peel to save his own life, and acted on that intent (although,
in the event, he killed Peel’s private secretary, Edward Drummond, who was
riding in the prime minister’s carriage that day). Abnormal perceptions or beliefs
motivate people with mental disorders and they then act on those beliefs. Their
criminal acts should not be understood mechanistically, like a fever that spikes
as the result of an underlying infection. Causation should be understood in this
context in terms of assessing the defendant’s reasons for action.
Finally, simply because a mental disorder played a causal role in explaining
criminal behavior, it does not follow that the person could not control that
behavior. The notion of loss of control of action is notoriously fraught. A
minority of jurisdictions have a control test for legal insanity in addition to a
cognitive test, and the Supreme Court has approved the use of control criteria
for sexual-predator commitments.9 But the meaning of these tests—at least to
the extent that a defendant’s control of his behavior is considered independent
of his rationality—remains conceptually and empirically unclear. For these
reasons, both the American Psychiatric Association and the American Bar
Association recommended abolition of control tests for legal insanity.
Now let us turn to the statistical association between mental disorder and
criminal behavior generally, but with the understanding just explored that the
underlying causal account in an individual case should be understood in terms
of reasons for action. If the relation is strong, adequate treatment might have a
8.
9.

Gene Heyman, Addiction: A Disorder of Choice (2009).
Crane, 534 U.S. at 407–08.
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preventive effect, and knowledge about a subject’s mental disorder might enhance
the accuracy of predictions about future criminal behavior. Policymakers should
not be swayed, however, by a few high-profile acts of violence committed by
people who apparently had mental disorders. Instead, they should focus on the
best large-scale studies that have been properly done methodologically.
Investigation of good studies discloses a far weaker connection between
major mental disorder and criminality than many people stereotypically
assume. Most people with mental disorder do not engage in serious criminal
behavior and are more likely to be victims of violence than perpetrators. The
rate of serious criminal behavior among people with major mental disorder
is approximately the same as the population as a whole—about 3% to 4%—
unless the person is also abusing substances, which does increase the rate. This
is unsurprising because people with serious disorders do have higher rates of
substance-use problems, probably because they are self-medicating to deal
with the pain of mental disorder and related problems. Nonetheless, even in
this co-morbid population—people with major mental disorder and substance
abuse—the rate of serious criminal behavior is low.10 Moreover, the association
between psychotic states and violent behavior is weak and inconsistent. The
strongest association between mental disorder and violent conduct is selfharm, especially suicide by gun.11 This is tragic, but not a criminal justice issue.
In short, there are clear cases in which mentally abnormal thoughts and
moods may be causally related to criminal conduct, but for the most part,
major mental disorder is not a major cause of crime. There is a powerful moral
and social argument that better mental-health services should be provided to
the population at large and especially to those without the resources to afford
private care. It is a mistake, however, to believe that more aggressive mentalhealth care, including increased use of involuntary civil commitment or
compulsory treatment, will make much inroad in preventing serious criminal
behavior. Such interventions, which often involve substantial deprivations of
liberty, may have positive mental-health outcomes for some sufferers, but they
will have slight impact on criminal conduct.
The final general issue is the relation of mental disorder to the prediction of
future criminal behavior. Policymakers must recognize that very serious violent
behaviors are relatively low frequency. That is, the base-rate for such behavior
10.
Cf. Jeffrey A. Miron, “Drug Prohibition and Violence,” in the present Volume. Crossreferences to other chapters in this Report are inserted in the footnotes for the convenience of
the reader. Such cross-referencing does not indicate that the author of this chapter necessarily
endorses any or all of the arguments presented in the cross-references.
11.
Cf. Franklin E. Zimring, “Firearms and Violence,” in the present Volume.
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is small. It is very difficult to predict low base-rate behaviors accurately unless
one has a very sensitive prediction method that has a high true positive rate.
Unfortunately, with low base-rate behaviors, a sensitive method may identify
most true positives, but it will also produce a vast number of false positives in
which criminal behavior will be predicted but will not occur.
At present, there are three general types of prediction methods that are used
in mental health (and in other contexts): clinical prediction, semi-structured
clinical judgment (SCJ), and actuarial. In the former, the predictor decides what
data are relevant and how to combine them based on his personal education
and experience. In the latter, the types of data to be obtained, the methods
for obtaining them, and how they should be weighed are prescribed based on
large-scale studies that produce an algorithm for prediction. The outcome is
preordained by the algorithm. This is the method used by large life-insurance
companies to assess death risk among applicants for life-insurance policies.
In SCJ, the predictor typically uses some type of structured prediction rating
scale, but then may adjust the outcome depending on personal experience and
judgment. Actuarial prediction is vastly more accurate than clinical prediction,
which tends to be quite inaccurate. There is a dispute about whether actuarial
is more accurate than SCJ, but for now the default probably is that they are
about equally accurate and both are substantially more accurate than clinical.
Nonetheless, probably the majority of predictions made in the criminal
mental-health context are clinical despite the clear evidence that this is not
best practice. That must change. SCJ or actuarial prediction methods should
be mandated if they exist for the type of prediction in question. If none exists,
there is no alternative to clinical judgment, but policymakers and decisionmakers should understand how inaccurate such prediction will be.
RECOMMENDATION: When predicting future behavior, the most
accurate type of prediction method available should be used. If actuarial or
structured clinical judgment methods are available for the type of prediction
in question, they should always be preferred to purely clinical prediction.
Using a mental-disorder variable as part of a criminal-behavior prediction
system can improve accuracy, but not by much. Many other variables, such as
sex, age, and especially prior history, are far better predictors than a diagnosis.
One diagnosis that is associated with higher accuracy is psychopathy because
it includes antisocial behavior as part of its criteria and thus builds in prior
history. Still, it independently does increase accuracy. One would expect
this among a population marked by indifference to morality and the rights
and needs of others. Among the highest-risk group of inmates or forensic
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patients with mental disorder, short-term prediction is decently good with
actuarial methods, approaching 70% accuracy. With less-risky people in these
populations, the accuracy drops off markedly. In general, however, accuracy is
produced largely by variables other than diagnosis. In brief, mental disorder is
a very weak predictor of future criminal behavior.
Given the history of the United States, there is a serious question whether
one sensitive variable that perhaps increases accuracy in the criminal justice
system—race—should be used when predicting future criminal behavior,
both among subjects with and without mental disorder. It would be hard
to avoid using it, especially unwittingly, in the case of clinical and SCJ, but
it could be omitted from an actuarial algorithm. There is general consensus
that race independently of, say, socioeconomic status, is at most an extremely
weak predictor of recidivism.12 Using it contributes to negative stereotypes and
arguably perpetuates the structural problems that cause the association between
race and criminal behavior.13 Policymakers must be sensitive to the issue when
considering predictive technologies, but race could safely be ignored in most
instances of predicting recidivism without compromising accuracy.
RECOMMENDATION: Race should not be considered as a variable when
predicting recidivism.
II. MENTAL DISORDER AMONG CRIMINAL JUSTICE INMATES:
PREVALENCE AND NEEDS
According to large-scale epidemiological studies that used DSM-IV
diagnostic categories, which are largely similar to those in DSM-5, about 1 in
10 United States adults suffers from some mental disorder. The most serious
disorders, e.g., schizophrenia, major depression, bipolar disorder (manic
depression), have lower rates. For example, schizophrenia is diagnosed in
about 1% to 2% of the general population. The prevalence of disorders among
prison and jail inmates varies substantially by jurisdiction and by the diagnostic
criteria used and the methodology employed to collect the data. Nonetheless,
there is wide agreement that mental disorder and especially serious mental
disorder is considerably more prevalent among inmates than among the
12.
See John Monahan, “Risk Assessment in Sentencing,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
13.
For discussions of the impact of race on criminal justice, see, for example, Jeffrey Fagan,
“Race and the New Policing,” in Volume 2 of the present Report; Devon W. Carbado, “Race and
the Fourth Amendment,” in Volume 2 of the present Report; David A. Harris, “Racial Profiling,”
in Volume 2 of the present Report; L. Song Richardson, “Police Use of Force,” in Volume 2 of the
present Report; Paul Butler, “Race and Adjudication,” in Volume 3 of the present Report; and
Cassia Spohn, “Race and Sentencing Disparity,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
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general population.14 Estimates run from about 50% to 75% of inmates,
with higher rates in jails, and among females and younger people. These
numbers have risen substantially in recent decades, including the numbers of
inmates with serious mental disorders, such as psychotic and major mood
disorders. For example, on any given day according to the American Psychiatric
Association, between 2.3% and 3.9% of inmates in state prisons are estimated
to have schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder; between 13.1% and
18.6% have major depression; and between 2.1% and 4.3% suffer from bipolar
disorder. The prevalence of drug problems is cloudier because of the changes
in diagnostic criteria, but estimates range from 25% to 60% and co-morbidity
seems true for about 45% to 50%. Whatever the precisely accurate prevalence
is in fact, it is clear that prison and jail inmates suffer from very high rates of
mental disorders and more people with serious disorders are in prisons and
jails than in hospitals.15
In addition to the suffering that many inmates with mental disorder
experience as a result of the disorder itself, inmates with disorder are more likely
to be victimized and placed on suicide watch, can be management problems,
are more likely to get into fights, and to have other difficulties. In addition, as a
result of their history of mental disorder, many have substantial interpersonal
and psychosocial deficits that make it difficult for them to be productive, lawabiding members of the community. Treatment needs in prisons and jails are
large and acute.
The United States Constitution gives little purchase to the mental-health
treatment rights of people incarcerated in the criminal justice system. The
Court has never held that there is a general right to adequate mental-health
treatment in either the criminal justice or involuntary civil commitment
contexts. Two cases, Estelle v. Gamble16 and Youngberg v. Romeo,17 provide
14.
All the following data come from the sources cited in this note. See Dean Aufderheide,
Mental Illness In America’s Jails And Prisons: Toward A Public Safety/Public Health Model,
Health Affairs Blog (Apr. 1, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/04/01/mental-illnessin-americas-jails-and-prisons-toward-a-public-safetypublic-health-model/; Paula M. Ditton,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates and
Probationers (July 1999); Doris J. James & Lauren E. Glaze, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates (revised Dec. 14, 2006);
Azza AbuDagga et al., Individuals with Serious Mental Illnesses in County Jails: A Survey of Jail
Staff’s Perspectives: A Research Report From Public Citizen’s Health Research Group and The
Treatment Advocacy Center (July 14, 2016).
15.
This is true, but it ignores the evidence that hospitalization would not be necessary for
most people with severe disorders if appropriate services were provided in the community.
16.
429 U.S. 97 (1976).
17.
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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only minimal guidance. In Estelle, which addressed the constitutional right to
health care of prisoners generally, the Court noted that the prisoner had no
access to services other than those the prison provided, but held that an Eighth
Amendment violation was colorable only if the prison demonstrated “serious
indifference” to the health-care needs of an inmate. This is a very low bar. One
assumes that ordinary indifference would not raise a potential claim.
In Youngberg, the Court was asked to decide whether the Due Process
Clause guaranteed a profoundly intellectually disabled inmate of a civil state
institution the rights to safety in confinement, freedom from bodily restraints,
and treatment. Applied in the context of intellectual disability, the latter was
termed training or “habilitation.” The Court held that the inmate had the
first two rights and the third in so far as it was necessary to guarantee the
first two. But the Court also noted that no constitutional violation would
obtain if “professional judgment” was used to determine the inmate’s needs
and otherwise inadequate habilitation would be acceptable within broad
limits if it resulted from insufficient availability of state resources. It should
be apparent that these two cases do not offer strong constitutional support
for the state’s need to provide robust, effective mental-health treatments in
prisons and jails. As long as the state is not seriously indifferent to prisoners’
mental-health needs, and, assuming Youngberg roughly applies to prisoners,
some professional judgment is applied (even if constrained by state resources),
constitutional requirements are satisfied. As a matter of morality and justice,
however, this is unconscionable.
It is of course unrealistic to expect prisoners to receive the highest level of
care that would be available in freedom and on the open market. But, at the
least, they should receive a level of care reasonably adequate to meet medical,
psychiatric, and psychological ethical standards. There is widespread agreement
that mental-health treatment for prisoners, especially in local jails, does not meet
this standard.18 Medication is typically available in prisons, but far less so in jails.
Adequate pharmacological treatment for psychotic, severe mood, and serious
anxiety disorders is not a simple matter, however. Done properly, it requires a
careful evaluation and careful follow-up to consider how the medication chosen
is working and whether the dosage or the medication itself needs to be changed.
There is virtually no treatment for substance use disorders in jails and prisons,
including methadone maintenance, although large number of inmates have
such disorders and could benefit greatly from such treatment. Contingency
18.

See Treatment Advocacy Ctr., The Treatment of Persons with Mental Illness in Prisons
A State Survey (2014), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/
treatment-behind-bars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf.
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management programs for addicted inmates, in which there are rewards and
graduated sanctions for abstinence and lack of it, would also be helpful.
For many reasons, there are simply insufficient numbers of mental-health
professionals working in the prisons and jails to satisfy this need. There are
large numbers of inmates who need help, but states and localities seldom
budget enough resources. Most qualified professionals would rather work in
more pleasant environments. In virtually all jurisdictions, only psychiatrists
among the mental-health professionals are qualified to prescribe medication.
Psychologists, social workers, and psychiatric nurses are limited to providing
psychological services, which, although important, are not the first line of
treatment in custodial settings, and there are simply not enough psychiatrists
properly to prescribe medication and to follow the care of inmates. Outside
of prison, a great deal of psychotropic medication is prescribed by family
physicians, internists and other primary-care doctors, and non-psychiatrist
prison doctors can prescribe, but such professionals are not mental-health
specialists, and the quality of care is lower.
A major reform that would permit enhanced pharmacological treatment
would be to authorize other mental-health professionals to prescribe
psychotropic and substance-use medications. Psychologists who have special
training in psychopharmacology already have prescription privileges in limited
jurisdictions, including Louisiana, New Mexico, and Illinois. Many psychiatrists
object to this, but it would immeasurably alleviate the burden of providing more
adequate and available drug treatment without endangering patients. Even if a
jurisdiction was unwilling to permit non-physicians to prescribe psychotropic
medications generally, the practice might be limited to other professionals
working in jails and prisons. In my opinion, psychiatric social workers and
psychiatric nurses as well as psychologists who undergo the necessary training
should have prescription privileges for psychiatric medications.
RECOMMENDATION: Non-physician health-care providers in jails and
prisons, especially psychologists, psychiatric social workers, and psychiatric
nurses, who have received adequate training in prescribing psychotropic
medication, should be permitted to prescribe psychotropic medication and
medication for substance use disorders.
Psychotherapy (counseling) and psychosocial rehabilitation are indicated
for many people with mental disorder for whom drug treatment might be
useful but still insufficient to help alleviate psychological abnormalities and to
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decrease interpersonal and social-skill deficits.19 These services can be provided
by any trained mental-health professional, not just by psychiatrists, but they
can be labor-intensive, especially individual therapies with sufficient frequency
of provision to be useful. Such services are rare in custodial settings, although
various forms of group therapy are often available. How effective such services
are with prisoners and which ones have not been rigorously evaluated, so it
seems to me premature to recommend much greater allocation of resources for
psychological services. Rather, experimental trials of various forms of therapies
should be performed to develop the database to determine whether and for
whom such services are cost-benefit justified.
Treatments for the special populations of addicts and sexually disordered
sexual criminals are of limited effectiveness. Indeed, some data concerning
the latter suggest that treatment is an increased risk factor for recidivism. If
treatments for these types of offenders were effective, then it would probably
be quite cost-benefit justified to make them available. Relevantly, the Supreme
Court held in Hendricks20 that the provision of treatment was not necessary
to justify the involuntary commitment of mentally abnormal sexually violent
predators, and experience with these commitments suggests that treatment is
not of great help because almost no one committed under these schemes is ever
released. My conclusion is that until more-rigorous data proves the effectiveness
of treatment for these groups, major resource allocation would not be justified.
RECOMMENDATION: Until rigorous data support the effectiveness of
various psychological treatment methods for prisoners, including special
populations such as addicts and sexual offenders, large-scale resource
allocation for such methods should be limited, especially for methods
focused on individual cases.
Although many populations need and deserve services for various problems
and money is not limitless, prisoners are entirely under state control and have
no alternative means of obtaining care. To the best of my knowledge, there is
no rigorously obtained database that links increased resources and care among
prisoners to long-term mental-health outcomes. Decency demands, however, that
more money should be spent on research concerning prisoners’ mental-health
care and the provision of such care itself, especially appropriate prescription of
and follow-up for psychotropic medication and substance use treatment.21
19.
For a discussion of rehabilitation, see Francis T. Cullen, “Correctional Rehabilitation,” in
Volume 4 of the present Report.
20.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
21.
See generally Margo Schlanger, “Prisoners with Disabilities,” in Volume 4 of the present
Report.
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RECOMMENDATION: Jail and prison mental-health services need to be
dramatically improved.
III. DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICE REFORMS
In this part of the chapter, I address those aspects of doctrine and practice
that seem most in need of reform. For those who wish more information and
analysis, in earlier writing, I have treated these issues at vastly greater length.22
A. CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL DISORDER
A particularly vexing problem is the rise of mental disorder among localjail inmates. Many attribute this to the de-institutionalization movement that
began in the 1960s and that led to the closing of mental hospitals, the reduction
in psychiatric hospital beds generally, and the decreased use of involuntary
civil commitment. One phrase characterizes the history as a movement from
de-institutionalization to “trans-institutionalization,” with local jail facilities
replacing hospitals as the location of first resort for holding people with mental
disorders who are presenting public problems. In other words, in the absence
of a viable hospitalization alternative, we are now using the misdemeanor
public “nuisance” behavior of people with mental disorder to send them to jail
rather than to hospitalize them. Sometimes we use arrest even in the absence
of probable cause to believe a misdemeanor has occurred.
Although there is truth to some of the descriptive parts of this argument—
for example, hospitalization has declined and penal incarceration in jails has
increased—I think much of the trans-institutionalization claim is misguided.
Involuntary hospitalization is a massive intrusion on the liberty of the
individual, as the Supreme Court recognized in O’Connor v. Donaldson,23 and
it was often based on inaccurate clinical predictions that the person was going
to be a danger to himself or to others. Hospitalization is the most expensive
form of mental-health treatment, and there is much evidence to suggest
that it is not necessary if proper services are provided in the community.
De-institutionalization did not fail. It was never really tried because most
communities did not make adequate services available when the hospitals
closed. Further, there was good evidence that hospitalization was not costbenefit effective for mental disorders, although it did remove bothersome
people from the community.

22.
Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal, Law, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 885
(2011).
23.
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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Some people with serious mental disorders can seem threatening or be
offensive and are often responded to negatively. Petty assaults may result. If
people with disorder are poor and homeless, they may commit petty theft, and
public disturbance can occur. Previously, the police would take such people
to a mental hospital’s emergency room. Although that is still possible, it is
much less common for the reasons given. As a result, they are far more likely
to be jailed if the police believe they must be taken out of the community.
This is particularly unfortunate because jails, especially in big cities, are highly
stressful environments and the mental-health care available is very poor. We
should also note that for more serious criminal behavior, there has been no
“trans-institutionalization.” People arrested for such crimes have always been
responded to by being jailed. No suspected murderer, rapist, or armed robber
was taken to the mental hospital’s emergency room as the venue of first resort.
There is undeniably a problem of large numbers of mentally disordered
misdemeanants being in jail.24 But how should it be addressed? A return to
large-scale involuntary hospitalization would be unwise for the reasons the
system was dismantled in the first place and it would be infeasible to re-create
it. One could decriminalize low-level misdemeanors generally, but that, too,
would be infeasible. So, assuming that the behaviors resulting in jailing should
be criminalized, the most obvious solution has already been addressed in the
preceding section: provide sufficient mental-health care in the jails. Assuming,
too, that most of the jailed inmates with mental disorder are responsible for the
criminal behavior that resulted in jail time, they are rightly there and should
then be treated properly.
Jailing mentally disordered, low-level misdemeanants seems harsh and
inefficient to many, including me. Diversion from the criminal justice system is
a much more attractive option in appropriate cases, but the mechanisms now
available are problematic.25 Despite the popularity of specialty problem-solving
courts, such as drug courts and mental-health courts, there are significant civilliberties concerns about these courts.26 Also, they have not been rigorously
evaluated for effectiveness. Finally, they are not used in cases of violent crime,
which would include assaultive behavior, but such cases are common among
mentally disordered people who are arrested.

24.
For a discussion of misdemeanors, see Alexandra Natapoff, “Misdemeanors,” in the
present Volume.
25.
See generally Michael Tonry, “Community Punishments,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
26.
See generally Richard C. Boldt, “Problem-Solving Courts,” in Volume 3 of the present
Report.
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Involuntary outpatient commitment is another promising diversion
possibility. Without some form of coercion, many mentally disordered people
who have been arrested for misdemeanors will not adhere to treatment
regimens. Outpatient commitment has been shown to be successful, but
only if treatment of sufficient intensity and duration is provided. In either
case, effective mechanisms for triggering diversion would have to be adopted.
Police officers typically have a fair degree of experience assessing whether a
subject is seriously mentally disordered, and with training, they could do even
better at making such judgments and interacting successfully with disordered
people. When officers arrest misdemeanants, they might be able to make onthe-spot decisions to call psychiatric emergency teams to trigger outpatient
commitment. In the alternative, all misdemeanants placed in jail could be
evaluated within 24 hours for their suitability for outpatient commitment.
Both mechanisms—police judgment and in-jail evaluation—might be highly
successful in diverting misdemeanants to outpatient treatment rather than jail.
In addition to the problems noted above, specialty courts would not provide
an efficient diversion mechanism for misdemeanants because invoking this
process is time-consuming and jail terms are typically relatively short.
Assuming that an effective and efficient mechanism for diversion could be
devised, it is still utterly crucial that sufficient resources for adequate treatment
in the community be provided. If mentally disordered misdemeanant arrestees
are diverted to an inadequate treatment environment, little will be gained.
RECOMMENDATION: Mentally disordered people arrested for nonviolent
or minimally violent offenses should be diverted from the criminal justice
system to the mental-health system. Adequate methods for effective and
efficient triggering of diversion must be devised, and adequate treatment
must be provided in the community to the people diverted. Law enforcement
officers should receive special training in dealing with mentally disordered
people to enhance diversion and to deal with such people humanely.
B. FORENSIC EVALUATION AND THE RIGHT
TO A MENTAL-HEALTH EXPERT
Pretrial forensic evaluations are routine both to determine various
competencies and to evaluate legal insanity and whether the defendant
committed the alleged crime with the mental state, the mens rea, that is part of
the definition of the offense. For example, one definition of murder is that the
defendant acts with the intention or the purpose to kill the victim. The results
of such evaluations can also have a major impact on sentencing, and, indeed,
a forensic evaluation at any time may be useful for sentencing alone even if no
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competence or defense issue is raised. For example, a defendant with a mental
disorder who is competent and has no plausible insanity defense or mens rea
claim may nonetheless have a good argument for mitigation at sentencing.
Major issues are whether determinations requiring a forensic evaluation are
truly adversarial and whether an indigent defendant should be entitled to a
genuinely independent expert to assist him.
In the case of competence evaluations, the defendant seldom has his own
expert. State-appointed forensic professionals are virtually always the only
experts who examine the defendant, and trial judges—this issue is seldom
decided by a jury—routinely simply rubber-stamp the state experts’ opinions.
Much is at stake in competence evaluations. This type of process is unlikely
to lead to a full evaluation of the issues. These proceedings should be fully
adversarial with experts on both sides.
RECOMMENDATION: Competence determinations should be fully
adversarial, with experts representing both sides.
Suppose defense counsel suspects that a defense based on mental disorder is
a plausible claim at trial or simply wishes to evaluate whether it is. Or, suppose
that the defense counsel believes that although no doctrinal defense based on
mental disorder is likely to succeed, mitigation at sentencing is appropriate.
Anyone with experience in criminal mental-health practice understands that
mental-health experts, typically psychiatrists and psychologists, play a crucial
role. Although either the defense or prosecution can succeed with or defeat a
claim involving mental disorder without using expert witnesses, as a practical
matter, it is extremely difficult and perhaps impossible for the defense.27 This is
not a problem for wealthier defendants who can retain a genuinely independent
expert, but it is a major problem for indigent defendants. Unless an indigent
defendant has access to an expert paid for by the state, the defendant will
seldom have a fair chance of succeeding with his or her claims.28

27.
Abraham S. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 124 (1967) (“Though the cases say again
and again that expert testimony is not ‘essential’ to raise the insanity defense, it is clear that a
persuasive case is unlikely to be made on lay testimony alone.”). Although a guilty verdict will
typically be upheld even if the defense presents unanimous expert testimony that the defendant
was legally insane and the prosecution rebuts this testimony only with lay witnesses and crossexamination, such cases are rare at the trial level. See Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 453 (5th
ed. 2010) (noting that it is difficult to succeed without expert witnesses, but that appellate courts
uphold verdicts based on lay testimony “not infrequently”).
28.
Id. For a discussion of indigent defense, see Eve Brensike Primus, “Defense Counsel and
Public Defense,” in Volume 3 of the present Report.
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In Ake v. Oklahoma,29 the Supreme Court finally recognized the unfairness of
not providing an indigent defendant with a mental-health expert. It noted that
fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to an adequate opportunity
to present their claims.30 The Court further held that a mental-health expert
is necessary for this purpose when the defendant has a significant claim of
legal insanity or needs expert assistance at capital sentencing hearings to rebut
expert predictions of dangerousness.31 The Court left the implementation
of the right to the states.32 The decision is correct, but it left open important
questions about the extent of the right and how it should be implemented. In
particular, it did not decide whether the indigent defendant is entitled to a truly
independent expert to represent him.
The Court’s opinion did not address whether experts also needed to be
provided to assist the defendant with other claims concerning the relation of
mental disorder to culpability and to sentencing. A majority of states permit
defendants to use evidence of mental disorder to negate mens rea, although
usually with limitations.33 Mental disorder can also be a mitigating factor at both
capital and noncapital sentencing, and expert predictions of dangerousness
at noncapital sentencing may need to be rebutted. Even if there is no expert
prediction of dangerousness in capital and noncapital sentencing proceedings,
there may be a plausible case for mitigation.
In all these contexts, the defendant is in peril without expert assistance.
It is difficult to understand how these other types of questions involving
mental disorder can be distinguished from legal insanity and rebutting expert
predictions at capital sentencing. It is true that legal insanity is a complete
defense and that death is “different.” Nonetheless, mens rea is a crucial
culpability issue. In many cases, a mens rea negation claim may be more
important to a defendant than raising legal insanity because the defendant can
thereby potentially defeat the prosecution’s ability to prove the mental state
element for higher levels of offense, thus reducing his potential sentence, and
can avoid lengthy post-insanity acquittal commitments. Moreover, sentencing
is vitally important to the defendant in all cases, and raising mitigation at
capital sentencing is especially important, as the Supreme Court recognized
beginning with Lockett v. Ohio.34 Experts should be appointed and paid for
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

470 U.S. 68 (1985).
Id. at 77.
Id. at 83–84.
Id. at 83.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 800 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
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in all these cases that so fundamentally affect the defendant’s culpability and
punishment, but the reach of Ake is unclear. Failure to do so is substantially
unfair because a defendant with a potentially meritorious claim of innocence
or mitigation will not be able to raise it effectively.
RECOMMENDATION: A mental-health expert should be appointed to
assist a defendant with any potential claim based on mental disorder that
bears on culpability and punishment.
The more difficult problem is how the right has been implemented in many
jurisdictions. Ake has not been interpreted to guarantee the defendant a mentalhealth professional that the defense chooses.35 If a defendant has resources, he
can “shop around” to try to obtain a mental-health professional who will support
his claims, but indigent defendants do not have that ability.36 If the professional
consulted will not render a favorable opinion, the defendant’s mental healthbased argument will almost certainly fail. In some jurisdictions with a sizable
number of forensic professionals, some experts may have a reputation for being
favorable to the defense and the problem may be somewhat alleviated. There is
no guarantee, however, that even a favorably inclined forensic professional will
reach the expected conclusion, and the possibility of using a predisposed expert
may not arise in jurisdictions with fewer forensic specialists. What is worse, in
some jurisdictions the defendant may be assigned a mental-health professional
who is an employee of the state and the prosecution may immediately have
access to the report.37 A state employee inevitably has a conflict of interest. The
indigent defendant should be entitled to an independent professional, as some
jurisdictions, including a majority of the federal circuits, hold.38
Ake was ambiguous about whether it required the provision of a genuinely
independent mental-health expert who is part of the defense team or whether
a single neutral, court-appointed expert who makes his findings available to
both parties and the court is sufficient. Just this past term, the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to resolve the resulting split among the lower federal
and state courts about Ake’s reach. In McWilliams v. Dunn,39 the Supreme
Court re-affirmed Ake’s language that in an appropriate case raising a mentaldisorder issue, an indigent defendant is entitled to an expert independent
35.
E.g., United States v. Osoba, 213 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2000).
36.
Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
37.
Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963, 963–64 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
38.
John Parry, Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony 131–32
(2009).
39.
137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017).
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of the prosecution to assist with an examination, an evaluation of the case,
preparation for trial, and presentation of the defense. But the decision failed
to resolve the fundamental issue that had divided the lower courts. Instead,
the Supreme Court ruled on case-specific grounds that the defendant had not
been granted the minimum Ake requires because the state had provided only
an examination and no further assistance.
McWilliams is a lost opportunity. The Supreme Court should have decided
that Ake requires the provision of an expert who is part of the defense team
and not simply neutral and independent of the prosecution. In the absence
of a controlling Supreme Court decision, legislatures should impose this
requirement statutorily. Once the threshold questions of indigency and a
legally relevant mental disorder have been satisfied, it is clear that there is an
issue to be decided and that some qualified mental-health professional will be
able and willing to assist the defense in the ways Ake demands. Some mentalhealth professionals may, of course, conclude that the defense claim is not
meritorious, including some who might be neutral and independent of the
prosecution. If the narrower reading of Ake prevails, the defendant will not be
able to present his claim if a single neutral, court-appointed expert concludes
it is not meritorious—despite a virtual certainty that another professional
could ably assist the defense. An expert who concludes that the defense claim
is invalid obviously cannot help the defendant in evaluating, preparing, and
presenting his mental-health claim. In an adversarial system of criminal justice,
it is simply unfair not to provide an indigent defendant with a professional
dedicated to his defense.
Even providing a genuine defense expert does not go far enough. The expert
should not be an employee of the state and should be chosen by the defense.
Further, the defense expert’s report should not be disclosed to the prosecution
unless the defendant decides to go forward with a mental health-based argument.
An independent expert’s report should be the defense’s “work product” and thus
confidential unless the claim is raised. The fruits of an evaluation of a potential
claim should not be of benefit to the prosecution. It may fairly be asked how
many experts the indigent defendant is entitled to consult in order to obtain
an expert who will support the defense claim. As noted, in jurisdictions with
many forensic mental-health professionals, it will usually be easy to identify
those professionals who are disposed to the defense. Nonetheless, a usually welldisposed expert may reach a conclusion unwelcome to the defense. To even the
role of wealth in criminal justice outcomes, I would allow the indigent defendant
to consult a second expert if the first is not favorable.
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RECOMMENDATION: Defendants with a mental health-based claim
should be entitled to a genuinely independent mental-health expert of his
own choosing retained for the defense team, and the results of the evaluation
should be confidential work product and not disclosed to the prosecution
unless the defendant intends to use the evaluation to support a claim.
Should the defense attorney be present when the defendant is clinically
examined by the prosecution’s expert? Courts have rejected such arguments
on the ground that the attorney’s presence will undermine the expert’s attempt
to obtain information and could be otherwise disruptive.40 For example, the
attorney might try improperly to caution or to coach the client during the
evaluation. There is some truth to these worries, but I think that they are
exaggerated and that there is good reason to have the attorney present. The
examiner inevitably will be wittingly or unwittingly selective in his report and
testimony about which aspects of the examination are focused on. It is all too
easy for an expert to succumb to confirmation bias and to ignore contrary
evidence. Moreover, inferences from, and conclusions about, particular parts
of the examination are subject to subjective interpretation.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, psychiatry is not an exact
science.41 Consequently, it would be very helpful to both sides to be able to view
the examination of the defendant by the opposing expert or by the sole expert
in non-adversarial proceedings. Both attorneys can then have a better sense
of whether an evaluation actually supports or is consistent with the testifying
expert’s inferences and conclusions based on the evaluation. The potential for
disruption remains, however, so I suggest that all forensic evaluations should
be videotaped. This would not be disruptive and would allow the type of
assessment that would be helpful. Indeed, in some cases, the tapes might be
shown to the jury guided by the expert testimony about them.
Psychological testing, the other major form of forensic evaluation, need not
be taped. It is true that a psychological test can be improperly administered in
various ways and there is some evidence that testers tend to interpret results
more favorably to the side that retained the expert. It seems, however, that
taping will not substantially alleviate this problem. It will be sufficient if the
opposing expert has access to the raw scores on the tests in question so the
expert can determine if the test was properly scored and interpreted.

40.
United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting the claim that the State
does not need an independent evaluation).
41.
See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
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RECOMMENDATION: Clinical forensic evaluation interviews should be
videotaped, and the raw scores of psychological tests should be provided to
the opposing side.
In cases involving allegedly civil preventive detention, such as sexual-predator
commitments, the subject of the potential commitment is not constitutionally
entitled to the service of an independent professional and seldom has one unless
the subject has independent means. Moreover, the subject does not have the
right to remain silent.42 Great weight will be placed on the testimony of the stateappointed evaluator, and the subject’s only means of defeating an adverse opinion
will be through effective cross-examination. There are no data on this question,
but I suspect that judges and juries seldom find that the subject does not meet
the commitment criteria, even if cross-examination is effective. For example, the
subjects have typically committed seriously dangerous acts and it is difficult to
establish the negative that the subject will not commit another dangerous act
if released. Most preventive detention commitments associated with criminal
justice are potentially indefinite. A subject faced with such a drastic loss of liberty
should have a right to the services of an independent mental-health professional
to defeat the allegation that he should be detained preventively.
RECOMMENDATION: In quasi-criminal proceedings, such as those
involving the civil commitment of mentally abnormal, sexually violent
predators, the person facing commitment should be entitled to a genuinely
independent mental-health professional to assist him.
C. COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
Competence to stand trial is the most frequently raised doctrinal mental
health issue in the criminal justice system. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that an incompetent defendant cannot be tried.43 Although the criteria
for incompetence vary among the jurisdictions, a common standard is that the
defendant must have the ability to understand the charge and proceedings and
must be able to rationally assist defense counsel in order to be found competent.
There is a good argument that many defendants who are incompetent could
nonetheless receive a fair trial, thus avoiding some of the negative consequences
of a finding of incompetence, but it is settled constitutional doctrine that an
incompetent defendant may not be tried. In this section, I shall focus primarily
on the restoration of competence.
42.
E.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986).
43.
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975). Some
refer to Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), as the crucial precedent, but Dusky was
simply an interpretation of the federal statute and not a constitutional case.
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I suggest that lawyers appointed solely to evaluate trial competence would
be better evaluators of a defendant’s trial competence than mental-health
professionals because lawyers comprehend much better what understanding
and assistance are necessary. The mental-health expert will have a better
understanding of why the defendant is allegedly incompetent, and the clinician
is certainly better positioned to recommend treatment. Nonetheless, the cause
is usually apparent, and why the defendant is incompetent is relevant only to
the potential treatment to restore competence. The evaluating professional is
virtually never involved in the treatment process, so the treatment evaluation
will have to be made independently in any case. For now and for the foreseeable
future, however, the evaluations will be done by mental-health professionals.
A defendant found incompetent to stand trial will typically be committed
to a forensic hospital or forensic unit of a hospital for treatment to restore
competence. In the leading precedent, Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court
held that due process requires that the nature and duration of the commitment
should bear a reasonable relation to its purpose, which is to restore trial
competence.44 The Court did not provide much guidance about the length of
these commitments, and they vary substantially among jurisdictions. Thus,
although there is only probable cause to believe the defendant has committed the
crime, he can be incarcerated without trial in a secure facility for many years—
in some cases as long as the sentence for the crime charged—despite the lack of
a conviction.45 Although the time hospitalized is counted toward any criminal
sentence ultimately imposed, the hospitalized incompetent defendant is in
legal limbo, and incompetence can be used as a tactic by both the prosecution
and the defense.46 To the extent that incompetence commitment is used by
the prosecution to preventively detain an accused for whom the case may be
weak, this is an abuse of the incompetence procedures. The Supreme Court
in Jackson also held that a defendant who is irreversibly incompetent to stand
trial must be released from the criminal justice system, but state officials clearly
have substantial discretion to decide that the incompetence is not irreversible
and thus to continue what may be improper preventive detention.47

44.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). In some jurisdictions, trial competence
treatment can be performed in the local jail. See Cal. Penal Code § 1369.1(a).
45.
Parry, supra note 38, at 116.
46.
Norman G. Poythress et al., Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies 49–50 (2002).
47.
Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. If the examining or treating mental health professionals
unanimously conclude that an incompetent defendant cannot be restored, then the state will
have to use some other means, such as civil commitment, to restrain a permanently incompetent
defendant who is believed to still be dangerous.
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Finally, the Court suggested, but did not require, that pretrial motions,
such as to suppress evidence, could be adjudicated, even if the defendant were
incompetent to stand trial.48 In some cases, this might have the effect of ending
the prosecution because suppressed evidence is crucial to the prosecution’s case,
but there are no data about how often such pretrial proceedings are used. In
sum, much potential exists for abuse of incompetence-to-stand-trial doctrines
and practices. It is time to rethink them. Virtually everything I shall say in what
follows has been suggested previously,49 but the system does not change and
abuses are not curtailed.
If the criminal process can be halted by the suppression of evidence or other
pretrial proceedings, it should be. An incompetent defendant is presumed
innocent and should have available any pretrial action that can halt the
prosecution. The defendant may go free because the constable has blundered,
but that is the cost of doing business in a system dedicated to protecting the
rights of defendants. If the defendant is still mentally disordered and nonresponsibly dangerous as a result, the state can resort to traditional involuntary
civil commitment to protect the public. This is an imperfect remedy, but no
system of preventive detention can guarantee society’s perfect safety and still be
consistent with due process concerns. The defendant may not ever be brought
properly to justice, but such a commitment is preferable to outright release,
which is what would happen if the defendant were competent.
RECOMMENDATION: Defendants who are incompetent to stand trial
should be permitted without exception to raise pretrial motions that might
end the prosecution.
Intellectual disability and severe mental disorder are the primary abnormalities
related to incompetence. Intellectual disability itself cannot be treated, but it
is possible through educational techniques to teach a defendant some of the
communication or other cognitive skills, such as an understanding of the criminal
process, necessary to restore trial competence. If such interventions are provided
soon and with reasonable intensity, the treating personnel can discover in a
matter of months and perhaps only weeks if the defendant is capable of learning
the necessary skills. There is utterly no need for long-term hospitalization and
its use is simply a means to reach another, constitutionally impermissible goal in
this context, such as preventive detention.
48.
Id. at 741.
49.
E.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Standard 7-4.13
(1989); Robert Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 66 (1972).
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Severe mental disorder, including psychotic states, is more treatable,
especially with psychotropic medication. Psychotropic medication is not a
cure-all, however. A substantial number of patients do not respond, even to
the most effective agents. All the drugs have side effects that can be extremely
serious and unpleasant, and the drugs do not provide life skills that the person
did not formerly possess. Thus, even if the person responds well to psychotropic
medication and regains reasonable cognitive control, some educational
interventions may also be necessary to prepare the defendant for a criminal
trial. Despite the difficulties, medication will be the first treatment of choice
for most defendants who are incompetent because they are out of touch with
reality. In virtually all cases, a determination can be made within six to nine
months that the defendant is or is not treatable. There is no need for longer
commitment to restore trial competence.50 A conclusion of irreversibility can
be reached and further commitment for restoration is once again preventive
detention. Thus, all jurisdictions that permit lengthy restoration commitments
are in virtually all cases engaged in permitting preventive detention rather than
in genuine restoration commitment. 51
Finally, in many cases, especially those involving nonviolent defendants,
there may be no need at all for in-patient hospitalization. Community-based
treatment may be sufficient either to restore competence or to determine that
this is impossible. Community treatment is preferable because it deprives a
defendant not yet convicted of less liberty than hospitalization and it is much
less expensive.
RECOMMENDATION: Long-term inpatient commitments to restore trial
competence are unnecessary. Short-term commitments are adequate to either
restore the defendant or to determine that the defendant cannot be restored.
In appropriate cases, restoration should be performed in the community.
50.
Suppose the defendant competently refuses to take psychotropic medication, thus
preventing the government from restoring his or her trial competence. It is perfectly possible that
a defendant with mental disorder might be incompetent to stand trial but competent to refuse
medication. Disordered thinking can be relatively domain-specific, diminishing competence in
some areas of functioning and not in others. On the other hand, Robert Schopp has argued
convincingly that an incompetent defendant will also be incompetent to refuse treatment in
virtually all cases. Robert F. Schopp, Involuntary Treatment and Competence to Proceed in the
Criminal Process: Capital and Noncapital Cases, 24 Behav. Sci. & L. 495 (2006). The law is not
entirely clear about the government’s right to override an incompetent refusal of a committed
person without a special procedure such as securing a guardian who can substitute judgment,
but I shall argue that the government should have the right to treat defendants incompetent to
stand trial whether or not they are competent to refuse treatment.
51.
Most defendants are restored to competence within six months. Poythress et al., supra
note 46, at 51. Nonetheless, the potential for lengthy commitment remains and can be abused.
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In Sell v. United States,52 the Supreme Court addressed whether and under
what conditions the state could forcibly medicate an incompetent defendant for
the purpose of restoring the defendant’s competence to stand trial. The Court
agreed, as it had previously,53 that citizens have a strong liberty interest in being
free of unwanted medical interventions.54 The Court nonetheless held that an
incompetent defendant could be involuntarily medicated if four conditions
were met: the treatment was medically appropriate, the governmental interest
was strong because the charges were serious, the treatment would not cause
trial prejudice, and less restrictive means of restoring competence were not
effective.55 The Court did express a preference for treating the defendant under
an independent and less fraught rationale, however, such as the defendant’s
dangerousness.56 Not all incompetent defendants will satisfy such an
independent rationale for involuntary treatment and trial courts will have to
apply the Sell criteria.
Three of Sell’s conditions are appropriate, but I would go further and
argue that the government’s interest in trying an accused is sufficiently strong
in the case of any felony to justify forcible medication of an incompetent
defendant for the purpose of restoring competence. A criminal prosecution
is an extremely serious matter. Neither the case nor the prosecution and
defense should remain in limbo while an incompetent defendant languishes
in a hospital untreated. The incompetence standards and consequences are not
meant to be used strategically by either side. What is the point of keeping an
52.
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
53.
In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Supreme Court decided under what
conditions a prisoner could be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs. The Court noted that
everyone has a substantial liberty interest in being free from unwanted medical interventions.
Id. at 221–22. The Court held, however, that prisoners could be forcibly medicated for their own
safety or the safety of others if medication was medically appropriate and the prisoner posed a
danger to himself or others. Id. at 227. I will discuss Harper in greater detail in Section III.I, infra.
54.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 178.
55.
Id. at 180–81. Whether the medication will have an adverse effect on the fairness of trial
because it alters the defendant’s behavior negatively, such as impairing communication abilities,
is an important issue. See id. at 185–86. Anti-psychotic medication at proper dosage levels
typically does not sedate the defendant or otherwise impair a person’s abilities. Rather, if effective,
it restores cognitive functioning and should enhance the defendant’s performance. On the other
hand, it may make the defendant appear “normal” to the judge or jury, which might undermine
a claim that the defendant was legally insane, or it might alter the defendant’s demeanor in a
prejudicial way. Such possibilities especially concerned Justice Kennedy. See Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127, 142–45 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). These potential difficulties could be
alleviated by expert testimony and judicial instructions. In an extreme case, however, the Sell
criteria will not be met.
56.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 181–82. The Court expressed a preference for justifying medication
according to the Harper criteria. Id.
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incompetent defendant in a hospital to restore competence if restoration is
made impossible by treatment refusal? The intrusion of forcible medication
is not trivial, to be sure, especially if refusal is based on religious convictions,
but neither is it so extensive that it should block the progress of the case. It is
not a form of thought control or any other type of unjustifiable intervention.
Forcible medication simply tries to restore the person’s cognitive control and
ability to test reality. Moreover, hospitalization is expensive and should be
terminated as soon as possible. Finally, no good alternative presents itself. If the
defendant can prevent restoration, rendering him permanently incompetent,
then the government must dismiss the charges, presumably with prejudice,
and seek involuntary civil commitment. As we have seen, however, this is an
imperfect remedy. If the person could be forcibly treated in involuntary civil
commitment or in some other way, such as the substitution of judgment by a
guardian because the defendant is not competent to refuse, then perhaps trial
competence could be restored in those ways.
RECOMMENDATION: Forcible medication to restore trial competence
should be justified in the case of all felony prosecutions.
Unless the Supreme Court reverses decades of incompetence jurisprudence,
it is not possible to try incompetent defendants even in those cases in which
they could receive a fair trial. Permitting a trial to proceed despite a defendant’s
incompetence would solve many of the problems raised by Sell or by cases of
seeming permanent incompetence, allowing final resolution of the criminal
justice process. One may fairly ask how we could be sure that such a trial would
be fair, but I suggest that this could be resolved at pretrial hearings. Everything
depends on how complicated the issues are and whether difficult strategic
choices will be necessary in which the defendant would be likely to disagree
with the attorney’s advice. We could also adopt various protective rules, such
as requiring the prosecution to disclose evidence that may not pass the Brady
threshold of actual-innocence evidence, but which arguably favors the defense.57
In any case, the issue will not arise frequently because most state and federal
cases are resolved by plea bargains.58 Nonetheless, the incompetence process
would be rationalized in those cases in which going to trial seems optimal and
a fair trial was possible despite incompetence. I recognize it is controversial
to suggest that trial could proceed against an incompetent defendant, and
undoubtedly the procedural requirements to guarantee fairness would be
complex. In principle, though, this is a reform that could work.
57.
58.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
See generally Jenia I. Turner, “Plea Bargaining,” in Volume 3 of the present Report.
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D. COMPETENCE TO PLEAD AND TO WAIVE COUNSEL
In Godinez v. Moran,59 the Supreme Court was asked to impose a standard
of competence to plead guilty and to waive the right to counsel, a so-called
“reasoned choice” test that was different from the standard for incompetence
to stand trial. The argument for doing so was that pleading is more complicated
than going to trial and therefore a different and presumably higher standard
was required to satisfy due process. The Court refused to adopt a different test,
holding that the competence-to-stand-trial standard was sufficient to protect the
defendant’s rights as long as the waiver of the right to trial and other constitutional
protections was actually knowing and voluntary.60 After all, a defendant might be
competent but might not actually understand what he is doing as a result of
confusion, marginal competence, or the like. In my view, the Court missed the
theoretical and policy mark, although the holding is not self-evidently wrong.
All competence standards are essentially functional rationality tests. The
question is what rational understanding and skills are required. Although
competence standards generally should be low, what is required can vary
according to the context. Consequently, “one size fits all” standards in many
contexts make little sense. For example, some trials are complicated and some
guilty pleas are not, and vice versa. It is a fantasy to believe that any particular
standard, such as competence to stand trial, adequately operationalizes the test.
Even if the standard specifies what must be understood, it does not specify how
much understanding and of what type is required. Is the ability to accurately
recite information previously provided sufficient or must the agent be capable
of a process of rational weighing and assessment?
Although different “skills” may in theory be necessary to accomplish different
tasks successfully, such as assisting counsel and deciding whether to plead guilty,
it is not clear that the allegedly higher standard that the Court rejected, “reasoned
choice,” would make much difference in practice. Rational understanding and
reasoned choice are both vague formulations that provide little guidance. The
test should be a functional and context-dependent rationality standard,
focusing on what skills are demanded in a particular context, whichever
words are used to express the standard. Waiver of distinct constitutional
rights implicates distinct rational understandings of each right waived. Thus, a
defendant who appears to have general rational understanding may appear on
close examination to lack that understanding for a particular trial right. If the
trial court makes a careful inquiry concerning whether a particular waiver is
59.
509 U.S. 389 (1993).
60.
Id. at 400. In his concurrence in Godinez, Justice Kennedy characterized the requirement
as “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Id. at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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knowing and voluntary, the more general and specific inquiries should merge,
as the Godinez dissent recognized.61 Once again, however, what is necessary
is not a distinct formulation for competence to plead guilty or to waive the
right to counsel, but a context-dependent evaluation by the trial court of the
defendant’s rational capacities necessary in each context. Finally, if a different
or higher standard had been imposed, it is not clear that trial courts would have
behaved differently, and appellate courts would rarely second-guess a trial court’s
substantive determination that a defendant was or was not competent.
Requiring deeper or more detailed rational understanding risks
parentalism,62 but requiring less risks an unjust outcome. I have a preference for
limiting parentalism as much as possible and perhaps the Court’s recognition
that the defendant must actually waive his rights knowingly partially remedies
the vagueness of the general test. On the other hand, defining knowing or
intelligent is as vulnerable to manipulation as defining competence itself. In
short, evaluating any competence case is a normatively fraught and difficult
enterprise. I have no easy answer, but simply a policy preference for keeping
the bar relatively low to let most defendants over it. This will maximize liberty,
but the danger is that it will also unduly risk the defendant’s ultimate liberty by
increasing the possibility of an irrational outcome.
RECOMMENDATION: The test for competence to plead guilty and to
waive counsel should be a context-dependent assessment of whether the
defendant has the rational skills necessary to meet a generally low standard
for competence.
E. THE RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE
Should a criminal defendant who meets the Godinez standard for waiving
the right to counsel, which is essentially the competence-to-stand-trial
standard, be permitted to proceed pro se—that is, without an attorney—if
he suffers from serious mental disorder? The constitutional right to proceed
pro se announced by the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California63 does not
depend on the defendant’s ability to function as an able defense counsel. As
long as the defendant understands the consequences of representing himself,
he is entitled to do so. Consequently, one would have thought that as long as
a defendant with severe mental disorder understood what he was doing, he
would be entitled to represent himself.
61.
62.
63.

See id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Parentalism is a gender-neutral synonym for paternalism.
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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Nevertheless, in Indiana v. Edwards,64 the Supreme Court held otherwise,
unpersuasively distinguishing Godinez on the grounds that the issue of selfrepresentation was not raised in the previous case and that Godinez involved
permitting a defendant to represent himself whereas the instant case involved
a state trying to prevent the defendant from doing so. Writing for the majority,
Justice Breyer cautioned against trying to apply a unitary competence standard
to address two very different questions: whether a represented defendant is
capable of going to trial and “whether a defendant who goes to trial must be
permitted to represent himself.”65 Instead, Justice Breyer tried to apply a more
nuanced understanding of competency that properly considered context. He
recognized that a defendant with a disorder might be able to assist counsel
but might nonetheless be too disabled to perform basic trial tasks at even a
minimal level. He therefore worried that an apparently unfair trial could
result. Discretion was left in the hands of trial judges to decide if a defendant is
competent to represent himself.
This is a difficult issue for those like myself who are advocates for the rights
of people with mental disorder and who wish to treat them no differently
from other people if possible. Let us assume that if the defendant represents
himself, the trial will not be a complete sham, especially if backup counsel or
some other protective method is used to try to mitigate the dangers of selfrepresentation. On the one hand, if the defendant understands the perils of
self-representation, including how his own mental difficulties will interfere
with his performance, why should he not enjoy the usual, constitutionally
protected liberty to represent himself that Faretta established? On the other
hand, if mental disorder, which affects the defendant’s rational capacities,
interferes substantially with his abilities fully to understand the peril of selfrepresentation or minimally adequately to represent himself, the risk of an
unfair trial is high. It is not clear which approach best balances the rights of the
accused with systemic concerns.
I believe the solution lies with a more egalitarian approach to Faretta. People
might simply be too incompetent to represent themselves for a variety of reasons
other than mental disorder,66 even if they are competent to recognize how badly
they will do and wish to represent themselves anyhow. Edwards makes clear that
64.
554 U.S. 164 (2008).
65.
Id. at 165.
66.
See Jodi L. Viljoen et al., An Examination of the Relationship Between Competency to
Stand Trial, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights, and Psychopathology, 26 Law & Hum. Behav.
481 (2002) (demonstrating that some defendants are incompetent to plead or to stand trial for
reasons other than mental disorder).
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this type of restriction can constitutionally be placed on the Faretta right, at least
in cases involving a defendant with mental disorder, but there seems little reason
not to apply an “unreasonable trial incompetence” standard to deny the right to
represent oneself to any defendant who wishes to assert it. This will mostly apply
to defendants with disorder, but at least it is a cause-neutral standard that does
not discriminate against defendants with mental disorder.
F. NEGATING MENS REA
In some cases, mental disorder may explain why a requisite mens rea
(mental state) was not formed, whether or not it actually prevented the
defendant from forming it. A defendant who is making such a claim, which is
often mischaracterized as the “defense” of “diminished capacity,” is not raising
a claim of mitigation of responsibility or of excuse; it is simply a denial of
the prosecution’s prima facie (legally sufficient; all the criteria for guilty the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt) case, which includes
the mens rea required by the crime charged. I have termed this the “mens rea
variant” of so-called diminished capacity.67 For example, in Clark v. Arizona,68
defendant Clark shot and killed a police officer who had pulled the defendant
over in his police cruiser and was in full uniform. The defendant was charged
with the aggravated murder offense of intentionally killing a human being
knowing the victim was a police officer. The defendant claimed he lacked the
mens rea because he did not intend to kill a human being and did not know the
victim was a police officer. This claim would have been incredible, of course,
except that the defendant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and had
delusions that space aliens were threatening him. He claimed that he actually
believed that the victim was a space alien impersonating a police officer. If
he were believed—and there was evidence consistent with the truth of this
belief—he did not intend to kill a human being and did not know the victim
was a police officer. In this case, the mental disorder produced an irrational
belief that is inconsistent with the formation of the mens rea required to be
guilty of this aggravated murder offense.
It is also possible that mental disorder explains a failure to form a mens rea
that is not a result of an irrational belief. Imagine that a severely disordered
person is confused and disorganized on the streets of a large city in a deserted
neighborhood. It is freezing cold and the person realizes that he cannot find
67.
Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1 (1984).
68.
548 U.S. 735 (2006). All the facts in the following description are taken from the Court’s
opinion.
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his way home and fears freezing. He therefore breaks into a building simply to
keep warm. The police catch him and charge him with burglary on the theory
that he intended to commit the felony of larceny in the building. In this case,
the defendant was surely capable of forming the intent to commit larceny and
there was no rationality problem about what he was doing, but he simply did
not form the intent to steal. His disorganization resulting from mental disorder
simply helps explain why he broke in just to keep warm.
In most cases, mental disorder does not interfere with the formation of mens
rea. The primary effect of mental disorder on the mental states required by the
definitions of crimes is to give the defendant abnormally irrational reasons for
actually forming the requisite mens rea. Consider Daniel M’Naghten again. His
delusional belief about the Tories motivated him to form the intent to kill Peel.
In some cases, however, mental disorder may be the only credible explanation
for why a defendant did not form the mens rea required by the definition of
the offense. If a plausible claim of mens rea negation can be made, can the state
nonetheless exclude the evidence?
In Clark, the Supreme Court addressed precisely this issue and held that
the state could constitutionally exclude all non-observational expert evidence
of mental disorder that would be introduced to negate mens rea.69 The Court
approved Arizona’s “channeling” of all such evidence into the issue of legal
insanity because so-called mental disorder and capacity evidence bearing on
mens rea would simply confuse the finder of fact.70 Judge Morris Hoffman and
I have severely criticized the Court’s reasoning in Clark,71 but I will not repeat
those arguments here. Rather, I will simply go to the heart of why the Court’s
decision is unfair.
Criminal blame and punishment are the most awesome, painful exercises of
state action toward a citizen. In our adversarial system of criminal justice, the
defendant is presumed innocent and the prosecution has the burden of proving
the defendant’s guilt, including the requisite mens rea. Criminal liability should
69.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 772 (2006).
70.
Id. at 774–78.
71.
Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and
Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1071 (2007). The decision
was disappointing but not unsurprising after Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1966), in which
the Court upheld Montana’s complete exclusion of admittedly relevant and probative voluntary
intoxication evidence to negate mens rea on the grounds that the state had valid policy reasons
for doing so and that a criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to have relevant and
probative evidence admitted. Voluntary intoxication is of course distinguishable from mental
disorder because the latter is not the defendant’s fault, but the Court’s deference to the state rule
and justification for it was generalizable.
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not be imposed unless the defendant deserves such treatment.72 Desert is at least
a necessary condition of just punishment, and the fair ascription of criminal
culpability thus requires the presence of mens rea, which is a prime indicator
of the degree of the defendant’s fault. One would think that in such a system of
justice, fundamental fairness would require that a criminal defendant should
be given every reasonable opportunity to defend against the state’s charge with
credible and probative evidence.
There are a number of reasons that a jurisdiction might want to reject
or limit mens rea variant claims, many of which were discussed in the Clark
opinion. Psychiatric and psychological evidence can admittedly be scientifically
and clinically questionable and sometimes of faint legal relevance. I have been
a long-term critic of much forensic mental-health testimony and remain so.73
Moreover, even good forensic testimony can be confusing to lay witnesses.
Despite these problems—and the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged
them, including in Clark—mental-health testimony is routinely and generously
admitted in a wide variety of civil and criminal contexts because it is considered
relevant and probative. Indeed, the Court has accepted the admission of expert
testimony about the prediction of future dangerousness in capital sentencing
proceedings in the face of virtually unanimous professional opinion that such
predictions were too inaccurate to be the basis of a death sentence.74 The Court
held that such weaknesses were matters of weight rather than admissibility and
could be exposed through cross-examination and by opposing witnesses.75 If such
prosecution testimony is admissible to put a defendant to death, how can it be
fair to prevent the defendant from negating the prima facie case by using credible,
relevant, probative testimony that is admissible in every other legal context?
The “channeling” of mental-abnormality evidence into legal-insanity
claims is no remedy for the inconsistency because the mens rea variant is a
claim entirely distinct from legal insanity, even if the evidence used is similar
for both claims. In the former case, the defendant claims, “I didn’t do it”; in
72.
See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Retribution,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
73.
Morse, Crazy Behavior, supra note 5, at 600–25; Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations
and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 Va. L. Rev. 973 (1982) (providing
a detailed critique of psychodynamic psychology and forensic testimony that is based on this
theory of behavior); Stephen J. Morse, The Ethics of Forensic Practice: Reclaiming the Wasteland,
36 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 206 (2008) (claiming that forensic practice is not an ethical
wasteland, but recommending major changes to practice). Although there are still major
problems with forensic mental health testimony, I believe the situation is much improved
since I first addressed this, largely as a result of the creation of specialty boards in both forensic
psychology and psychiatry and the general professionalization of the field.
74.
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
75.
Id. at 896–903.
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the latter, the claim is, “I did it, but I’m not responsible.” How can it be fair
to permit the prosecution to use abnormality evidence to put a defendant to
death but to prevent the defendant from using credible and probative evidence
that he or she did not commit the crime charged in the first place?
A related rationale for denying or limiting mens rea negation is that it
“undermines” the insanity defense. It is not clear precisely what this rationale
means. Some courts reject the mens rea claim because they appear to assume
that this claim is a lesser form of legal insanity and thus a mitigating (but not
fully excusing) affirmative defense that should be adopted by legislatures rather
than by courts,76 but this is a confusion. Roughly speaking, the insanity defense
is based on the premise that the legally insane defendant substantially lacks
rational capacity or the capacity to control his or her criminal behavior. The
mens rea claim does not specifically address either capacity, however. It simply
addresses whether the defendant possessed the mental state required by the
definition of the crime.
A better argument is that a defendant who successfully raises the mens
rea variant may negate all mens rea and thus would simply be acquitted and
freed. In contrast, an insanity acquittee will be involuntarily civilly committed.
Moreover, the mens rea claim will be easier to establish than the legal-insanity
claim. Success in the former case requires casting only a reasonable doubt on
the prosecutor’s case, whereas the burden of proof for affirmative defenses
like legal insanity may be placed on the defendant, which significantly reduces
the defendant’s chance of succeeding.77 Thus, permitting the mens rea claim
may compromise public safety more than the insanity defense—a point to be
addressed immediately below—but this is distinguishable from claiming that
the insanity defense is thereby undermined. As we have seen, criminal liability
should not be imposed unless the defendant deserves such treatment, and
a defendant does not deserve blame and punishment for a particular crime
unless he possessed the mens rea required by the definition of that crime. The
defendant can avoid unjust blame and punishment either by negating mens
76.
State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523, 526–33 (Ohio 1982) (conflating the mens rea and partial
responsibility variants of diminished capacity and suggesting that the legislature and not the
court should adopt this “defense”) (quoting Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 92 (D.C. 1976)).
77.
Henry J. Steadman et al., Before and After Hinckley: Evaluating Insanity Defense Reform
84–85, 144–46 (1993). This study found that shifting the burden of persuasion caused a decline
in the number of insanity pleas raised and that the presence of a major mental disorder was a
necessity for success. It also found, however, that among the very few defendants in New York
who did raise the defense, the success rate increased. This seemingly paradoxical effect was
almost certainly caused because the defense was probably raised in only the clearest cases after
proving insanity became more difficult.
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rea or by establishing an affirmative defense. Mens rea and legal insanity are
independent doctrines. Both implicate public safety, but, more fundamentally,
they are aimed at doing justice. Permitting the defendant to negate mens rea
achieves justice independently rather than undermining the justice the insanity
defense achieves.
Perhaps the strongest reason for limiting or rejecting the mens rea variant
is the fear for public safety, a concern that might be the underlying foundation
for the claim that the mens rea variant undermines the insanity defense. It
is true that mens rea variant claims present cases in which fair ascriptions
of culpability and public safety might conflict. The defendant who lacks the
mens rea required by the definition of the crime is simply less culpable. But
a defendant with a sufficiently severe mental abnormality to negate mens rea
may also be a serious danger to the public because such severe abnormalities
also suggest that the defendant’s general capacity for rationality is diminished
in situations in which criminal conduct occurs. A defendant who succeeds with
a negation of mens rea claim will be convicted of a lesser offense that carries
lesser penalties or perhaps will be completely acquitted. Consequently, the
defendant will be incapacitated by imprisonment for a shorter period than if
he or she had been convicted for the offense charged or acquitted by reason of
insanity and then civilly committed.
The fear for public safety is genuine but overwrought. As noted, the effect
of mental disorder, including severe mental disorder, is seldom to negate the
“subjective” mens reas, such as purpose, knowledge, and recklessness, that are part
of the definitions of crimes. Mental disorder may give people irrational reasons
to form the mens rea, but it almost never interferes with formation of that mental
state. There are instances in which subjective mens rea is entirely negated, but
they are few, indeed. Moreover, no defendant can use evidence of mental disorder
to negate negligence because failing to recognize a risk the defendant should
have recognized because the accused is abnormal is per se unreasonable. There
are attempts to “individuate” the reasonable-person standard by endowing the
reasonable person with the characteristics of the accused, such as being mentally
abnormal, but this abandons objectivity altogether.78 After all, what does it mean
to talk of the “reasonable abnormal” person?
78.
Stephen J. Morse, The “New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome,” 14 Crim. Just. Ethics 3 (1995).
For example, H.L.A. Hart suggested general individuation of reasonable person standards for
negligence, but recognized that the individuation would be a matter of mitigation or excuse and
not of “subjective justification.” H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 153–54 (1968). The
most common doctrinal examples of the attempt to individuate the reasonable person standard
are in cases of self-defense and in cases concerning the reduction from murder to manslaughter
if the defendant was legally adequately provoked and killed in the heat of passion.
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In short, even if a jurisdiction permitted a defendant to negate mens
rea without any restriction whatsoever, public safety would scarcely be
compromised and greater individual justice would be gained. I propose that
this is precisely the rule that should be adopted and it is the Model Penal Code
rule.79 There will be occasions in which defendants raise implausible claims
about mens rea negation based on mental disorder, but these can be limited by
pretrial motions to exclude the evidence and similar remedies.
RECOMMENDATION: Defendants should be permitted to introduce
evidence of mental disorder without limitation to negate any subjective mens
rea but should not be permitted to use such evidence to negate negligence.
G. LEGAL INSANITY
Legal insanity is an affirmative, complete defense to crime; when successful,
it results in a verdict of not guilty (by reason of insanity), thereby excusing a
defendant for his otherwise criminal conduct. Forty-six states and the federal
criminal code have the defense.80 Most have some variant of the “cognitive”
M’Naghten standard, which asks whether as a result of mental disorder the
defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act or did not know
right from wrong.81 A minority also have an alternative “control” test, which,
as discussed earlier, asks whether as a result of mental disorder the defendant
could not control his criminal behavior.82 In Clark, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of Arizona’s test, which was simply the right/wrong
alternative in M’Naghten, although it is the narrowest conceivable test.83
The Supreme Court has never held that the insanity defense is required by
substantive due process and in 2012 denied review in a case that squarely
raised the issue.84 Further, the state supreme courts of four of the five states
that abolished the defense have upheld the constitutionality of abolition.85 A
compelling constitutional argument could be made for the necessity of the

79.
Model Penal Code § 4.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
80.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749–53 (2006) (providing a description of the various
rules and the number of jurisdictions that adopt each).
81.
M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
82.
Clark, 548 U.S. at 749–53.
83.
Id. at 742.
84.
Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038 (2012).
85.
State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003); State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996); State
v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884 (Mont. 1993); State v. Winn, 828 P.2d 879 (Idaho 1992). Nevada also
abolished the defense, but the Nevada Supreme Court held that abolition was unconstitutional.
Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001).

290

Reforming Criminal Justice

insanity defense,86 but, as I shall argue presently, abolition is a bad policy even
if it is constitutional. First, however, let us address a number of issues that need
to be clarified.
Legal insanity is a legal and moral issue, not a medical, psychiatric,
or psychological issue. The criteria for finding someone not criminally
responsible—for deciding who is a fit subject for blame and punishment—are
thoroughly normative. Thus, the claim that a test is “unscientific” is a category
mistake. One may believe that certain types of mental states should excuse
a criminal who possessed them at the time of the crime and may therefore
criticize on moral grounds a test that does not include them, but that is a
normative and not a scientific critique. A narrow test may be morally offensive,
but it will not be scientifically erroneous.
Mental disorder alone, no matter how severe, is not an excusing condition
even if it played a causal role in explaining the defendant’s behavior. Causation,
per se, is not an excusing condition.87 The moral basis for the insanity defense
is that in some cases mental disorder affects the defendant’s capacity to
act rationally or to control his behavior. These are the genuinely excusing
conditions that the other criteria for legal insanity address. The issue is the
defendant’s impaired reasoning. Excuse is warranted only in those cases in
which the impairment is sufficient, which is a moral and legal question. As
a practical matter, the defendant will have to be out of touch with reality to
succeed with the insanity defense,88 but many defendants who are concededly
delusional at the time of the crime may be convicted because their reasoning
about the crime was nonetheless not sufficiently impaired. For example, Eric
Clark was indisputably suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, but the court
convicted him because it concluded that Clark did know that what he was
doing was wrong.89
Much scholarly ink has been spilled and many pixels illuminated about
specific issues within M’Naghten and its variants, such as whether knowledge
of right versus wrong means moral or legal wrong and whether an allegedly
broader substitute for knowledge, such as appreciation or understanding, is
preferable. I believe that such debates are beside the point. To begin, the test
86.
Stephen J. Morse & Richard J. Bonnie, Abolition of the Insanity Defense Violates Due
Process, 41 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 488 (2013).
87.
Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1587, 1592–94 (1994)
(characterizing the erroneous belief that causation is per se an excusing condition as the
“fundamental psycholegal error”).
88.
Steadman et al., supra note 77, at 85.
89.
Clark, 548 U.S. at 745–46.
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used does not seem to make much difference in the outcome,90 a result I think
is best explained by the jury’s rough and ready conclusion that the defendant
was or was not sufficiently irrational to deserve to be punished.
To the extent that an outcome might turn on moral versus legal wrong, the
former should be preferred because it is more action-guiding and provides a
better fit with the underlying rationale for the defense. Note that all crimes for
which an insanity defense is typically raised are acts that are also objectively
and clearly immoral and illegal. The reason a legally insane offender typically
commits the crime is primarily because she believes that she has a sufficient
moral or legal justification for what she is doing. Consider Andrea Yates, who
delusionally believed that she needed to kill her children while they were still
sufficiently pure or they would become corrupted and would be tormented in
hell for eternity.91 Yates knew it was legally wrong to kill her children and she
might also have recognized that her neighbors might think it morally wrong
to do so. Nonetheless, from her deluded, subjective point of view, she surely
thought she was doing the right thing. If the facts and circumstances were as
she believed them to be, the balance of evils was positive in this case. Ms. Yates’s
knowledge of moral and legal wrong is beside the point, however. Although
Ms. Yates was instrumentally rational, she deserved to be excused because her
actions were deeply irrationally motivated through no fault of her own.
Many critics of cognitive tests believe that the word “know” is too narrow
and that other, apparently broader terms should be used that encompass a
somehow deeper understanding of what one is doing or that it is wrong.92
Every lawyer realizes, however, that almost any term used can be interpreted
more or less broadly to reach the morally preferred result. Consider knowledge
itself. Did Ms. Yates know what she was doing? The answer depends on whether
one takes a narrow or broad view of such knowledge. Ms. Yates knew that she
was killing her children, so she knew what she was doing in the narrow sense.
On the other hand, her material motive for action—to save the children from
eternal torment—was deluded, so she did not know what she was doing in a
broader sense. She thought she was saving the children, but she was not. The
same could be said of her knowledge of moral and legal wrong. Either result
could be obtained by narrow or broad readings of “understand,” “appreciate,”
90.
Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer & Carol S. Steiker, Criminal Law and Its
Processes: Cases and Materials 884 (8th ed. 2007).
91.
Deborah W. Denno, Who is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 Duke J. Gender
L. & Pol’y 1 (2003) (providing a complete account of the case).
92.
E.g., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 4.01, at 166, 169–70 (1985); Douglas
Mossman, United States v. Lyons: Toward a New Conception of Legal Insanity, 16 Bull. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 49, 54–57 (1988).
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or other contenders. Fine-grained parsing of small definitional differences will
not be helpful to finders of fact. A legislature can certainly signal by using a
term different from knowledge that it wishes to adopt a broader reading of
its cognitive test, but juries will still make a rough and ready judgment and
the word used has no influence on whether expert and lay testimony will be
admissible. In practice, the complete clinical picture will be brought to bear
whichever word is used.
If a defendant was sufficiently irrational, no separate control test will be
necessary to excuse him. Suppose, however, that the defendant was rational
according to any ordinary definition, but claims that he could not control himself.
Such claims are often associated with sexual disorders, substance disorders, and
impulse-control disorders generally. These are the cases in which an independent
control test is thought to be necessary. In the wake of John Hinckley’s acquittal
by reason of insanity for attempting to assassinate President Reagan and others,
many legislatures abolished a control test for legal insanity. The American
Bar Association and the American Psychiatric Association also took positions
rejecting the validity of control tests.93 Although it may seem unfair to blame
and punish an otherwise rational agent who cannot control himself, there was
good reason to jettison control tests. The primary ground was the inability of
either experts or jurors to differentiate the defendant who could not control
himself from one who simply did not. The presence of mental disorder is of no
help in this regard because criminal conduct is human action, even if it is the
sign or symptom of a disease. Concluding that human action is not controllable
because it is a sign or a symptom is simply question-begging.94 An independent
demonstration that the conduct could not be controlled is required.
I am an opponent of control tests because I have not encountered a
convincing conceptual account of an independent lack of control and an
operational definition of such an incapacity that would permit expert or
lay testimony to resolve whether a defendant had such a problem.95 I readily
concede that lack of control may be an independent type of incapacity that
93.
Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice Standards Committee, ABA Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards § 7-6.1 cmt. (1984); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, American Psychiatric Association
Statement on the Insanity Defense, reprinted in 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 681 (1983).
94.
Herbert Fingarette & Ann Fingarette Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal
Responsibility 148–53 (1979).
95.
Stephen J. Morse, Against Control Tests, in Criminal Law Conversations 449 (Paul H.
Robinson et al. eds., 2009). The latter was a “target” chapter that challenged proponents of
control tests to provide the psychological process or mechanism that produced lack-of-control
capacity and that could be the focus of testimony about it. Five critics responded to the chapter,
but not one even remotely suggested a mechanism or process.
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should mitigate or excuse responsibility, but until a good conceptual and
operational account of lack of control is provided, I prefer to limit the insanity
defense to cognitive tests.
Moreover, I believe that virtually all cases in which a control test seems
attractive or necessary can be better explained as a cognitive problem. People
who are out of touch with reality may have trouble controlling themselves in the
sense that they cannot be guided by reason, but irrationality is the problem. For
example, people with sexual or substance disorders may not appear irrational,
but they do report intense craving and often engage in repetitive actions that can
be ruinously costly to them. It seems natural to infer that they somehow cannot
control themselves. I suggest that the lack of control arises from the intensity of
desire that seems to drown out all the competing considerations that most of us
use to control untoward desires. In other words, at times of peak arousal, people
with these problems simply cannot be guided by the good reason not to yield
to their desires.96 Even if one accepts a control theory of mitigation or excuse,
in most cases the agent can still be held responsible. During those times when
arousal is dormant or low, they do have intact rational capacity and recognize
that they will yield in the future. It is therefore their duty to take whatever steps
are necessary, such as entering treatment, to ensure that they do not offend. If
they do not take such steps, they are responsible for not avoiding the condition
of their own excuse. In other words, even if sexual and substance disorders were
to qualify as a sufficient mental abnormality for establishing legal insanity and
even if people with these disorders were not rational at the time of the crime, a
successful insanity defense might nonetheless be inappropriate in most cases.
RECOMMENDATION: All jurisdictions should adopt a cognitive test for
legal insanity but should not adopt a control test.
An interesting and important issue that implicates the mental-disorder
criterion and both the cognitive and control tests is whether psychopathy
should qualify as a mental disorder for purposes of legal insanity and whether
at least some psychopaths seem to meet either a cognitive or a control test.
The issue is important because psychopathy is highly predisposing to criminal

96.
See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Science and Criminal Responsibility, in The Impact of
Behavioral Sciences on Criminal Law 241 (Nita Farahany ed., 2009) (providing a fuller account).
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behavior, including heightened recidivism,97 and is common among prisoners.98
Psychopaths simply do not get the point of morality or the underlying moral
basis of criminal law prohibitions. Criminal punishments are simply prices to
them. It may sound as if such people are simply callous and have an unfeeling
character, but the dominant understanding today is that they are disordered for
reasons not yet well understood.
The Model Penal Code’s insanity provisions exclude from the defense a
mental disorder “manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social
conduct.”99 Most courts have interpreted this provision to exclude psychopathy,
but the words of the section do not entail this conclusion.100 Repetitive antisocial and criminal behavior is one factor that can increase psychopathy scores,
but the diagnosis is not based on this factor alone. Thus, the language of the
various tests for legal insanity permits a reasonable case for inclusion. In brief,
the argument for excusing psychopaths, or at least some of them, is that they
lack the strongest reasons for complying with the law, such as understanding
that what they are doing is wrong and empathic understanding of their
victim’s plight.101 Most people can use empathy, conscience, understanding
of the reason underlying a criminal law’s prohibition, and prudential reasons
to guide their behavior. In contrast, as a result of their psychological deficits,
psychopaths can be guided only by prudential, egoistic reasons not to be
caught and punished. In other words, they cannot grasp or be guided by the
good reasons not to offend, which could be expressed either as a cognitive or
97.
Kevin S. Douglas et al., Risk for Criminal Recidivism: The Role of Psychopathy, in Handbook
of Psychopathy 533, 534 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006) (urging caution on methodological
grounds).
98.
See Thomas A. Widiger, Psychopathy and DSM-IV Psychopathology, in Handbook of
Psychopathy 156, 157–59 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006) (noting that there is strong overlap
between psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), but the relation is asymmetric;
APD is more prevalent among prisoners and virtually all prisoners who score high on psychopathy
meet the criteria for APD, but not the reverse). As discussed in Part I, psychopathy must be
distinguished from APD, which is included in the DSM. APD is diagnosed on the basis primarily
of repetitive antisocial conduct. There are only one and perhaps two psychological criteria
among the diagnostic criteria—lack of remorse and, arguably, impulsivity—but neither needs
to be present to make the diagnosis. Psychopathy, by contrast, always includes psychological
criteria. As a result, psychopathy might plausibly be a candidate for a mental disorder that would
support an insanity defense, but APD would clearly not qualify.
99.
Model Penal Code § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
100. Indeed, the Model Penal Code makes clear that its provision did not exclude a mental
condition “so long as the condition is manifested by indicia other than repeated antisocial
behavior.” Model Penal Code and commentaries § 4.01(2), at 164 (1985).
101. See Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility, 1 Neuroethics 205 (2008)
(providing a fuller account).
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control defect. And according to the same argument, people with lesser but
still substantial psychopathy should qualify for mitigation. In response, most
advocates for continuing exclusion of psychopathy as a basis for the insanity
defense argue that they are in touch with reality and know the rules and it is
sufficient for criminal responsibility that psychopaths can reason prudentially
about their own self-interest.102
Finally, in the United States, there is a major practical objection to applying
the insanity defense to psychopathic defendants. In all jurisdictions, a defendant
acquitted by reason of insanity may be involuntarily committed to a secure
hospital facility, a practice that the Supreme Court has held is constitutional and
that will be discussed in a later part of the chapter.103 The term of commitment
varies, but the Supreme Court has upheld an indefinite term104 as long as the
acquitted inmate remains both mentally ill and dangerous.105 It thus appears
that this would be a secure form of incapacitation for dangerous psychopaths
if psychopathy were accepted as a potentially excusing mental disorder.
Despite the initial attractiveness of this solution to the danger psychopathy
presents, it is unlikely to be successful. The insanity defense cannot be imposed
on a competent defendant who does not wish to raise it,106 and virtually no
psychopath would raise the insanity defense because at present there is no
effective treatment for adult psychopathy. Any psychopath acquitted by reason
of insanity for any crime would potentially face a lifelong commitment to
an essentially prison-like facility. In short, even if American law came to the
conclusion that psychopaths should be excused, few psychopaths would be
willing to accept such “lenient” treatment and we would still have to rely on a
pure criminal justice response. Thus, the only potential solution to the desertdisease gap psychopathy produces would be some special form of involuntary
civil commitment similar to sexual-predator commitments.107

102. Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character,
and Responsibility, 67 Ind. L.J. 719, 746–47 (1992). For an intermediate position, see Walter Glannon,
Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath, 1 Neuroethics 158 (2008) (arguing that psychopaths are
capable of instrumental reasoning and are capable of being guided by moral considerations to
some degree, but their cognitive and affective impairments warrant mitigation).
103. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); see infra Section III.M.
104. Jones, 463 U.S. 354.
105. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 76 (1992).
106. E.g., United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
107. Sexual-predator commitments are discussed in Section III.L. The same conceptual
and constitutional concerns would apply if a legislature attempted to create a special form of
commitment for some psychopaths.
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Finally, let us consider proposals to abolish the insanity defense and
potential alternatives to it. Abolition of the insanity defense is simply unfair
and there is no adequate substitute for it. Some people are so lacking in rational
capacity through no fault of their own that it would be as unjust to blame and
punish them as it would be to blame and punish young children or people with
dementia. The consequential grounds for abolition are unpersuasive,108 so the
only potentially convincing ground must be that it is not unfair to abolish the
defense. The late Norval Morris tried to make such an argument on behalf of
the American Medical Association, which took a position in favor of abolition
in the wake of Hinckley. Professor Morris argued that since poverty is a stronger
cause of crime than mental disorder and we think it is fair to blame and punish
poor criminals, it follows that it is fair to blame and punish criminals with
severe mental disorders. With respect, however, Professor Morris confused
causation with excuse. Poor criminals are not excused because they do not have
rational or control incapacities. Some offenders with mental disorder do have
such incapacities, which is why they are excused.
There is no suitable alternative to legal insanity. The most common alternative
is to permit evidence of mental disorder to be admitted to negate mens rea, but
this will fail to do justice and it can lead to morally and legally bizarre results. As
previously discussed, mental disorder, even severe disorder, seldom negates mens
rea; rather it gives the offender an abnormal, irrational reason to form mens rea.
In the Delling case cited in the beginning of this section, Delling delusionally
believed the two victims were sucking his brain out of his skull and would
thereby kill him. He carefully planned to kill the victims to save his own life, just
like M’Naghten. He clearly formed the intent to kill and was therefore prima facie
guilty of premeditated murder, but the trial judge explicitly found that he did not
know right from wrong. Idaho had abolished the insanity defense, however, and
thus Delling was convicted of murder. This case and others like it are the clearest
confirmation of the insufficiency of the mens rea alternative because, even those

108. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev.
777, 795–801 (1985) (rejecting various consequential and practical arguments for abolition). It
is possible that abolishing the defense will increase social safety because it will deter both some
severely mentally ill defendants who would succeed with the defense of legal insanity and some
normal defendants who might think that they can fake the defense. See Hart, supra note 78,
at 48–49 (conceding that abolition of all excuses might increase social safety, but arguing that
the cost to individual rights would be too high). Such deterrent benefit is entirely speculative,
however, and in the case of abolishing the insanity defense, the likelihood of achieving these
benefits is tiny. For a general discussion of deterrence, see Daniel S. Nagin, “Deterrence,” in
Volume 4 of the present Report.
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defendants most out of touch with reality will have no opportunity to raise a
defense unless there is a potential insanity defense. Justice Breyer’s dissent from
the denial of review in Delling explicitly recognized this.109
In some cases, a defendant charged with premeditated homicide might use
evidence of hallucinations or delusions to cast doubt on whether his intention
to kill was premeditated, but then he would still be convicted of a lesser form
of intentional homicide. If a defendant has an auditory hallucination of God’s
voice telling him to kill, conviction of second-degree murder would be unjust
because the defendant is not rational. Reconsider the facts in Clark.110 If the
defendant actually believed he was killing a space alien who was impersonating
a police officer, then he is not guilty of purposeful, knowing, or reckless
homicide. He would be convicted of involuntary manslaughter on a negligence
theory, however, because his deluded mistake was unreasonable. But this
defendant is not negligent in the ordinary sense. He cannot correct the error by
being more careful. He is irrational and does not deserve to be punished at all.
Conviction of involuntary manslaughter is morally and legally obtuse in such
a case of gross lack of rational capacity.111
Another alternative deserves brief mention: the verdict of “guilty but
mentally ill” (GBMI). This verdict has been adopted in a substantial minority
of states in addition to legal insanity, so it is an alternative rather than a
replacement. A GBMI verdict does not indicate reduced culpability, it does
not require lesser punishment, and it does not provide for hospitalization and
treatment that would not otherwise be available to the convict. Essentially,
the finder of fact is being asked to make a diagnosis in addition to a guilt
determination. It is not different from “guilty but herpes.” In short, GBMI
109. Delling, 133 S. Ct. at 504 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. Clark, 538 U.S. at 743–44.
111. In addition to the mens rea alternative if the insanity defense is abolished, Professor
Christopher Slobogin’s “integrationist” proposal for abolition should be briefly mentioned because
it is the only serious contemporary scholarly proposal and interesting in its own right. Christopher
Slobogin, Minding Justice: Laws That Deprive People with Mental Disability of Life and Liberty
51–60 (2006). This proposal would allow the defendant to use evidence of mental disorder to
indicate that he would have been justified or excused if the facts had been as he believed them
to be. The proposal depends, however, on adopting a subjectivized view of justification that is
unacceptable if the distinction between justification and excuse is to be preserved. It would also fail
to acquit many disordered defendants who have substantial rationality defects. Professor Slobogin
rejects rationality impairments as the basis for legal insanity, but he then inconsistently uses lesser
rationality to argue that juveniles are less responsible than adults. The integrationist proposal has
been subject to a great deal of criticism. See Christopher Slobogin, Abolition of the Insanity Defense
and Comments, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 95, at 473–92; Morse & Hoffman, supra
note 71, at 1123–31. No legislature has seriously entertained adopting the proposal.
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is a fraudulent verdict because it does not address any issue relevant to just
criminal blame and punishment and it has the potential to deflect juries from
proper insanity acquittals because they do not understand the insanity defense
or fear that it will cause the release of a dangerous offender.112 When GBMI
is available, jurors may falsely believe that they are “taking account” of the
defendant’s impairment and thus may improperly return the GBMI verdict
when an acquittal of insanity was appropriate. Paradoxically, defendants who
raise the verdict may receive even harsher sentences, so there is evidence that
its use is declining.113
RECOMMENDATION: All jurisdictions should adopt an insanity defense
to ensure that justice is done in appropriate cases and no alternative will
equally achieve this result.
Finally, should the jury be informed that the outcome of an acquittal will
be a form of involuntary civil commitment with a potentially indefinite term?
In Shannon v. United States,114 the Court held that federal trial courts need
not instruct the jury about commitment unless the prosecution affirmatively
misleads the jury about the consequences. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion
focused primarily on the traditional assumption that juries should decide
whether the defendant is culpable and should not be concerned with the
consequences of their verdict.115 Although this assumption may make sense
for the vast majority of cases in which the defendant will be imprisoned or
freed depending on the verdict—a fact jurors know—the insanity defense is
the only form of complete excuse that does not result in the defendant being
immediately freed. I recognize that jurors may not fully understand what
sentence will follow a conviction, but the insanity defense is unique because the
acquitted defendant is not freed. It would be understandable if a juror voted
to convict a legally insane defendant because the juror feared that a disordered
and dangerous person might be freed. Similarly, jurors may be far more
inclined to reach the just result if they learn that the insanity acquittee will be
preventively detained by post-acquittal commitment.116 Thus, I conclude that
the defendant should be entitled to a “consequences” instruction upon request.

112. Steadman et al., supra note 77, at 102–20 (describing the verdict as a compromise).
113. Id.
114. 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
115. Id. at 579–80, 586–87. In fact, Justice Thomas’s entire majority opinion relies on the
validity of this assumption.
116. This form of commitment is discussed in Section III.M, infra.
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I would not make it mandatory because, as Justice Thomas recognized, there
may be situations when the defendant would think it is not in his interest to
have the jury learn of the consequences.
H. “GUILTY BUT PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE”
In 2003, I proposed that the criminal law should include a generic, doctrinal
mitigating excuse of partial responsibility that would apply to all crimes, and
that would be determined by the trier of fact.117 This partial excuse would apply
in cases in which a defendant’s behavior satisfied the elements of the crime
charged, but the defendant’s rationality was non-culpably and substantially
compromised and thus the defendant was not fully responsible for the crime
charged.118 Current Anglo-American criminal law contains no such generic
partial excuse. Some doctrines, such as provocation/passion and extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation
or excuse, appear to operate in effect as partial excuses. They typically apply
only in limited contexts, however, such as to reduce a homicide that would
otherwise be murder to manslaughter.119
Criminal law already recognizes the moral importance of “partial
responsibility” for determining just punishment. Despite the lack of a generic
mitigating excuse and strict limitations on the few doctrines that serve this
purpose, the relevance of diminished rationality and diminished responsibility
to sentencing is widely and generally accepted. For example, Atkins v. Virginia,120
which categorically prohibited capital punishment of people with retardation
on Eighth Amendment grounds, was based precisely on this recognition. The
Court wrote:
117. Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim.
L. 289 (2003). I will use the terms “partial responsibility” and “diminished responsibility”
interchangeably, but the former should be preferred because there is no extant legal doctrine
by that name with which the proposed doctrine could be confused. Diminished responsibility
is probably more accurately descriptive, but there does exist a doctrine with which the proposal
might be confused. See Coroners and Justice Act 2009, c. 25, § 52 (Eng.) (discussing criteria
for “diminished responsibility”). This section came into force on October 4, 2010 as a result of
Statutory Instrument No. 2010/816.
118. The defendant could also plead in the alternative any other mitigating or full affirmative
defense, such as legal insanity.
119. Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The English doctrine
of “diminished responsibility,” which is quite expansive, is likewise limited to reducing murder
to manslaughter. See Coroners and Justice Act 2009, c. 25, § 52 (Eng.). See generally George
Mousourakis, Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses (1998); Partial Excuses to Murder
(Stanley Meng Heong Yeo ed., 1991).
120. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between
right and wrong.… Because of their impairments, however, by
definition they have diminished capacities to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes
and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.…
Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal
sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.… With
respect to retribution—the interest in seeing that the offender gets
his “just deserts”—the severity of the appropriate punishment
necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender.121

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines also explicitly adopt this principle by
providing for a reduced sentence if a “significantly reduced mental capacity
… contributed substantially to the commission of the offense.”122 Although
this provision applies only to nonviolent offenders, the limitation is based on
considerations of public safety, rather than on the belief that violent offenders
never suffer from reduced mental capacity or that such incapacity does not affect
the culpability of violent offenders. Even a preference for determinate sentencing
does not undermine the general acceptance of this view because it is typically
motivated primarily by concerns with disparate sentencing, rather than by the
belief that impaired rationality is unrelated to diminished responsibility.
I have long argued that the capacity for rationality is the fundamental
criterion for responsibility. Young children and some severely disordered
defendants are excused not because they are young or ill, but because youth
and disorder, respectively, are inconsistent with or impair the capacity for full
rationality.123 Sentencing reduction based on mental abnormality is premised
upon the same basis. Provocation/passion and extreme mental or emotional
disturbance as partially excusing mitigating doctrines are best explained by the
theory that these conditions non-culpably reduce the capacity for rationality.
121. Id. at 318–19. Note that these are largely rationality considerations.
122. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2004).
123. The Supreme Court confirms this in the case of juveniles. See Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005) (declaring unconstitutional application of capital punishment to juveniles
who committed capital murder at the age of sixteen or seventeen). The Court listed those
characteristics of adolescents, such as impulsivity, ill-considered action, and susceptibility to
peer pressure, as diminishing juveniles’ culpability and cited Atkins for the proposition that lesser
culpability should lead to lesser punishment, at least in the capital punishment context. Id. at
569–71. The factors used in both Atkins and Roper to justify diminished responsibility are best
understood, I believe, as rationality considerations. In the case of juveniles, lesser rationality
results from developmental immaturity rather than from an abnormality. See generally Barry C.
Feld, “Juvenile Justice,” in the present Volume.
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Finally, the claims for excuses based on newly discovered, alleged syndromes
are best justified as irrationality claims. How much rational capacity must be
impaired under what conditions to warrant excuse or mitigation is, of course,
a moral, political, and legal question.
Present law is unfair because it does not sufficiently permit mitigating
claims. Criminal defendants display an enormously wide range of rational and
control capacities. In some cases, there may be quite substantial impairments,
but such defendants simply have no doctrinal purchase to argue for mitigation
at trial or in the plea bargaining process. If criminal punishment should be
proportionate to desert, blanket exclusion of doctrinal mitigating claims and
treatment of mitigation solely as a matter of sentencing discretion are not fair.
To understand the unjustifiable limitations of current doctrine, consider the
impaired-rationality doctrines that reduce a murder to manslaughter: heat of
passion upon legally adequate provocation, and extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation of excuse.124 Why should
these doctrines be limited to homicide? For example, suppose a defendant
acting in the heat of passion intentionally burns the provoker’s property on
the spur of the moment, rather than killing the provoker. Or suppose that
an agent suffering from a non-culpable state of substantially diminished
rationality commits arson. Some arsonists and some criminals generally
might act with non-culpable, substantially impaired rationality that does not
meet the standards for a full legal excuse. Compromised rationality and its
effect on culpability are not limited to homicide. Moreover, such a generic
mitigating doctrine would be a more just and practical response than either
legal insanity or subjectivizing justification for claims of reduced responsibility
based on alleged newly discovered psychological syndromes. Fairness and
proportionality require that doctrinal mitigation should be available in all
cases in which culpability is substantially reduced.
I therefore propose the adoption of a new verdict, “guilty but partially
responsible” (GPR), that would apply to all crimes and that would be adjudicated
at trial (or that would be a new variable in plea bargaining). This would be a true
mitigating affirmative defense. I am not wedded to any particular set of criteria
for this doctrine. Any formula, such as the Model Penal Code’s “extreme mental
or emotional disturbance,”125 that captures the essence would be acceptable.
I would require that the impairment would have to be substantial, as does
the MPC. The consequence of this verdict would be a legislatively mandated
124. The English “diminished responsibility” doctrine operates similarly and is similarly
limited. See R. v. Golds, [2016] UKSC 61.
125. Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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reduction in punishment for the crime. I am not committed to any particular
reduction scheme, but considerations of public safety would have to play a
large role in determining how much reduction would be possible for various
crimes. This proposal has been called a “punishment discount,” and so it is.
But substantially impaired or coerced defendants deserve to pay a lesser price.
There are various practical problems that adopting this verdict might create,
but I argued in the original paper and still believe that these can be solved. It is
certainly worth trying the experiment in the interest of justice.
RECOMMENDATION: Legislatures should adopt a generic verdict of
“guilty but partially responsible” that would reduce the defendant’s sentence
in cases in which the defendant’s rationality was substantially compromised.
I. FORCIBLE MEDICATION AND TRANSFER TO HOSPITAL
In the context of potential forcible medication in the criminal justice
system, there is an inevitable and deep tension between traditional common
law and constitutional rights of the individual to refuse unwanted medical and
psychiatric treatment and the legitimate needs of the criminal justice system.
In Harper, the Supreme Court held that prisoners have a liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted psychotropic medication, but the state’s interest in the
safety of the prisoner and others would justify forcible psychotropic medication
if it were medically appropriate and the prisoner would otherwise be a danger
to himself or others as a result of mental disorder.126 I believe that the case is
properly decided. Prisons are a particularly difficult environment and interests
of institutional and personal safety are paramount. There are a few difficulties,
however. Psychotropic medications can be used as instruments of pure social
control, which is not justified. This could occur if the prisoner were dangerous
and mentally disordered, but there was no relation between the two. Harper
criteria should explicitly include a connection between the mental disorder
and the potential for danger.
RECOMMENDATION: Prisoners should be forcibly medicated under
a Harper rationale only if the prisoner’s dangerousness is a result of his
disordered state of mind.
The second problem is the nature of Harper hearings. The Supreme Court
approved Washington’s process, which permitted all the personnel involved,
including the prisoner’s adviser, to be employed by the institution.127 This creates
an inevitable conflict of interest, much akin to a non-independent evaluator
126.
127.

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225–29 (1990).
Id. at 233–36; see also id. at 250–55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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appointed under Ake. It is understandable that these hearings need not be fully
adversarial with the full set of criminal justice procedural protections because
this would be unduly burdensome for the state. The prisoner is facing the loss
of an important liberty right, however, and some independent check on the
institution should be provided. There are many ways this might be reasonably
accomplished without undermining the efficiency of the process, such as
providing counsel from a public defender’s office or a panel of community
attorneys, or an independent adviser or mental-health professional from
another institution.
RECOMMENDATION: Prisoners facing a Harper hearing should be
represented by an adviser, preferably an attorney, who is independent of the
prison or mental-health system in the jurisdiction.
If a prisoner’s mental disorder renders him unmanageable in the prison,
Vitek v. Jones128 held that the prisoner can be transferred to a hospital after a
hearing at which the prisoner has a right to be heard and the right to an adviser
(although not a lawyer). The Court recognized that the prisoner has an interest
in avoiding the stigmatization associated with mental hospitalization and the
possibility of forcible treatment. This is a sensible decision that reasonably
balances individual and governmental interests as long as the hearings provide
the defendant with a genuine chance to contest the transfer. It would be better
if the prisoner were represented by adversarial counsel rather than by an
appointed adviser who will typically be a prison employee and therefore subject
to conflict of interest. Providing counsel would not be unduly burdensome in
this context and it would provide greater fairness. Although Vitek does not
compel the government to provide adversary counsel, the state should do so in
the interest of justice.
J. SENTENCING
The issue in all types of sentencing, capital and noncapital, is the role
mental disorder should play for both mitigation and aggravation. Sentencing
schemes vary substantially across the United States, but I shall assume for the
purpose of argument that the judge has the authority to use mental disorder as
a sentencing factor. I should say at the outset that if the offender has a colorable
mitigation claim based on mental disorder or if the prosecution will introduce
mental-disorder evidence to support enhancement, as argued in Section III
B., the state should provide an independent mental-health professional to aid
the offender with sentencing. As people with criminal justice experience know,
for many offenders, the length of time that they will spend in prison is more
128.

445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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important than whether they are convicted. All sentencing, not just capital
sentencing, is vital to the offender, and the process will not be fair unless he has
the assistance of a mental-health professional in appropriate cases.
RECOMMENDATION: In all capital and noncapital sentencing
proceedings in which the defendant has a colorable mitigation claim based
on mental disorder or in which the prosecution will introduce mental
disorder evidence for the purpose of enhancement, the defendant should
have the right to an independent mental-health professional retained for the
defense to assist him with the claim.
Let us begin with mitigation. If the “guilty but partially responsible”
mitigation I proposed above were adopted, then the defendant would have two
chances to have his mental abnormality short of legal insanity considered. If
the jury accepted the GPR claim, then there would be no need for the judge
to consider mental-abnormality evidence at sentencing because a reduction
would be automatic. For now, however, using mental disorder to mitigate will
be almost entirely a matter of judicial discretion at sentencing.
In Graham v. Florida,129 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibited imposing sentences of life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) on juveniles who committed non-homicide
crimes, because juveniles were less responsible than adults and did not deserve
such severe sentences even for heinous non-homicide crimes. The Court’s
conclusion about diminished responsibility followed its reasoning in Atkins,130
which excluded people with retardation from receiving death sentences for
capital crimes, and in Roper,131 which exempted 16- and 17-year-old capital
murderers from capital punishment. The ground for diminished responsibility
was essentially that these defendants suffered from diminished rationality.132

129. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
130. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
131. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
132. In Graham, the Court explicitly relied on the Roper factors discussed supra, and also reemphasized that juveniles were not yet fully mature and might change as normal maturation
occurred. Nonetheless, lack of rational capacity was the primary ground. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–69.
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Graham was the first occasion that the Court used a diminished desert rationale
based on diminished rationality to insist on what is in effect mitigation for a
term-of-years sentence.133
The reasoning of Graham or the arguments I have made about guilty but
partially responsible generalize perfectly to using evidence of mental disorder
at the time of the crime for sentencing mitigation generally. Defendants do not
deserve mitigation solely because they were disordered, but they do deserve
it if the disorder impaired the rationality of their practical reasoning about
the criminal offense. Such rationality impairments can range along a long
continuum, however, and thus fine-grained differences in responsibility are
possible in principle. At present, however, we lack the conceptual and practical
capacity to respond in a fine-grained manner and the result will be inevitable,
unwitting abuses of discretion and unjustified disparities in sentencing.
Principled, finely calibrated sentencing is impossible. In such circumstances,
greater justice will be done if we recognize the inevitable limitations on finegrained individualization and try to achieve proportionate equality within
limited bounds.
In a few cases, mental-disorder evidence might also tend to show that the
defendant is less dangerous because it renders the defendant disorganized,
ineffective, or the like. If this were the case, there would be grounds for
mitigating a sentence on consequential grounds as well. Again, diminished
dangerousness would be a continuum, but we lack the empirical resources to
make such distinctions and predictions accurately.
There should be a legislatively mandated mitigation if the judge finds
that substantial diminished rationality existed at the time of the crime. The
amount of reduction could be a uniform percentage or might vary by crime
to adjust for social-safety concerns, but the sentencing judge would have no
power to individualize beyond the mandated reduction. Such one-size-fits-all
approaches risk unfair lumping and “cliff effects,”134 but the overall effects will
133. In Graham, the majority relied on Roper’s conclusion that adolescents are relevantly
different, but cited amicus briefs for the proposition that the adolescent brain was not yet fully
mature. Id. at 68. This has produced irrational exuberance among those who want courts to take
more account of neuroscience evidence. The Court referred generally to neuroscience to support
its conclusion that nothing in the science of adolescent development in the intervening five years
changed the Roper conclusion, but no one had argued to the contrary. Arguments in support of
juvenile LWOP in non-homicide cases were based entirely on other normative and empirical
arguments, and thus, I submit, the neuroscience was dictum.
134. I borrow this term from the economic literature on enforcement, which notes that equal
punishment for crimes of different seriousness produces crimes of greater seriousness. See
George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 526, 527 (1970).
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be positive. Most desert and danger criteria cannot be reliably measured, but
instead require rougher retributive judgments and often speculative empirical
assessments. Further, given the limits on human judgment and the greater
reliability of judgments with fewer categories, everyone can understand the
need for bright-line rules that risk some disparity at the margins. Less injustice
will be produced by this approach than the inequality flowing from the
unreliability of judgments involving more numerous categories.
RECOMMENDATION: Legislatures should adopt a mandated scheme
of mitigation if the sentencing judge finds that substantial diminished
rationality existed at the time of the crime. The amount of reduction could
be a uniform percentage or might vary by crime to adjust for social-safety
concerns, but the sentencing judge should have no power to individualize
beyond the mandated reduction.
Evidence of mental disorder can also be used for enhancement within the
authorized sentence range if it is a risk factor for future antisocial conduct.
For example, substance abuse and psychopathy are both serious risk factors
for future crime.135 Mental abnormality is thus a knife that cuts both ways in
sentencing. Although the relevance to both mitigation and aggravation is true
in theory, the empirical basis for the alternatives of mitigation and aggravation
is asymmetrical. Despite the problems with mental-abnormality evidence,
establishing that the defendant had a substantial mental abnormality at the
time of the crime and therefore deserves mitigation is reasonably possible. It is
a very fact-based issue that turns on the defendant’s mental states. Evaluation of
such states is a bread-and-butter issue in criminal (and civil) cases. Predictions
are of course based on facts, but even if the facts are established, the accuracy
of such predictions is weak, even if actuarial techniques or semi-structured
interviews are used. The level of acceptable accuracy is of course a normative
question that cannot be “read off ” from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Despite the Supreme Court’s willingness to accept admittedly inaccurate
predictions in Barefoot,136 one would hope that an extremely high level of
accuracy would be required before increasing a sentence or putting a capital
offender to death on the basis of a dangerousness prediction.
After Barefoot, there is no constitutional bar to introducing weak prediction
evidence, but sentencing enhancements should be rationalized to achieve
justice. To the extent one is doing evidence-based sentencing and is using
135. For a discussion of substance abuse, see John Monahan et al., Rethinking Risk Assessment:
The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence 94 tbl. 5.1, 141 (2001). For psychopathy,
see id. at 65–72; Douglas et al., supra note 97, at 534; Widiger, supra note 98, at 157–59.
136. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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reliable and valid diagnostic techniques and adequate databases, using mental
disorder as a risk factor seems reasonable. As mentioned previously, actuarial
methods and semi-structured interview techniques are state-of-the-art and
should be required.137 The difficulty is that too many claims for enhancement
based on predictions do not use the best techniques and data, despite large
improvements in the technology of prediction.
Our ability to make valid, fine-grained predictions about future danger
is quite limited at present, so I would limit enhancement to one grade of
enhancement if the defendant meets a legislatively mandated threshold of
heightened risk beyond the “average” case at the core of the penalty range. I
would also require that the sentencing judge should insist that the prosecution
demonstrate that the risk evaluation and prediction methods it uses are
state-of-the-art. Although the Constitution may require considerably less,
the defendant’s freedom is at stake and justice demands that we use the best
evidence before depriving it further.
RECOMMENDATION: In noncapital cases, mental disorder may be
used as an enhancement factor, but only if the most accurate methods of
predicting future behavior have been used and indicate a very substantial
risk; moreover, the amount of enhancement should be limited.
Capital sentencing, the most extreme form of crime and danger prevention,
like sentencing generally, raises the issue of the role of mental disorder as both a
mitigating and aggravating factor. The considerations are similar, but so much
more is at stake. Death is different.138
Beginning in 1978 with Lockett v. Ohio,139 the Supreme Court has made
clear that the defendant can introduce any potentially mitigating evidence
at capital sentencing proceedings, whether or not it supports a statutorily
authorized mitigating factor. It is universally accepted that mental disorder is a
mitigating factor, and many jurisdictions specifically list mental abnormality as
a mitigating factor, using language similar to the Model Penal Code’s “extreme
mental or emotional disturbance” criterion or a similar partial responsibility
standard.140 Although only a minority of states make “dangerousness,” per se,
a statutorily aggravating factor, dangerousness is incorporated implicitly or
137. Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20
Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 38, 39 (2011). See generally John Monahan, “Risk Assessment
in Sentencing,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
138. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, “Capital Punishment,” in Volume 4 of
the present Report.
139. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
140. Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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explicitly in other listed factors, and, as just discussed, purely clinical mentalhealth testimony is used to predict future dangerousness, despite the empirical
weaknesses of clinical predictions.
There are no constitutional means to exclude abnormality evidence for
the purposes of mitigation. The states should nonetheless be free to exclude
aggravating predictions because they are too inaccurate to be the basis for
imposing the death penalty, but, as a practical, political matter, I suspect that
no jurisdiction would do this. I therefore recommend again, as I have before
in this chapter, two less “extreme” protective measures. First, the state should
require use of the most empirically validated prediction methods rather than
clinical evaluations or responses to hypothetical questions. Actuarial methods
and semi-structured interview techniques are state-of-the-art and should be
required. Second, the defendant must have access to an independent mentalhealth professional to help him prepare mitigation evidence and to defend
against aggravation evidence of future dangerousness. Of course, if the defendant
does not raise mental abnormality, then, consistent with Estelle v. Smith,141 a
defendant cannot be compelled to undergo a psychiatric examination whose
results will be used at capital sentencing, unless the defendant consents to such
use. In that case, the state would have to rely on the answers to hypothetical
questions, which my proposal would bar.
K. COMPETENCE TO BE EXECUTED AND FORCIBLE
RESTORATION OF COMPETENCE
At common law, a prisoner sentenced to death could not be executed if
he was incompetent because he did not understand what penalty was being
imposed or why. The Supreme Court finally held142 and reaffirmed143 that the
common law practice has constitutional status under the Eighth Amendment.
In Ford, the first Supreme Court case to so hold, the Court noted that the
reasons for this uniform common law rule are less certain and uniform than
the rule itself.144 The Court then considered a number of historical rationales
that might support the doctrine, but, in short, the rationale is that executing
incompetent offenders is simply cruel and that society must protect the
defendant and protect the dignity of society.
In Panetti, the Court appeared to adopt a primarily retributive rationale,
suggesting that the incompetent offender could not recognize the gravity of
141.
142.
143.
144.

451 U.S. 454 (1981).
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986).
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007).
Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
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his crime and that executing him would not allow the community to affirm its
judgment that the prisoner’s culpability was so serious that he deserved death.145
The Court therefore rejected a narrow reading of the substantive requirements
for competence to be executed. Panetti was concededly delusional, and the
Court rejected a reading of Ford that would permit execution of an offender
who simply understood or was aware, rather than rationally understood, the
fact of execution and why he was being executed.146 The Panetti Court wrote:
Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put
an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a
context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve
no proper purpose. It is therefore error to derive from Ford, and
the substantive standard for incompetency its opinions broadly
identify, a strict test for competency that treats delusional beliefs
as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State has identified the
link between his crime and the punishment to be inflicted.147
It is clear that, unlike in Godinez, in which the Court rejected an allegedly higher
“reasoned choice” test for competence to plead guilty and to waive counsel,148 in
this context a higher standard is required. Death is indeed different.
For purposes of discussion, we must assume that the defendant was
competent to be tried, was properly convicted, was competent to be sentenced,
and was properly sentenced to death. There is much reason to question these
assumptions, despite the many procedural protections Justice Powell noted
in his Ford concurrence.149 It is possible, of course, that the offender was
not suffering from substantial disorder at the earlier stages of the criminal
process, and only became severely disordered in prison. Nonetheless, the most
common age of onset for psychotic ideation of the type that might undermine
competence, which is usually a symptom of schizophrenia, is from late
adolescence to the early 30s, although late-onset cases do occur.150 Therefore,
many people later found incompetent to be executed were probably suffering
from substantial mental problems at the time of the crime and during trial
and sentencing—problems that were not sufficiently addressed or properly
considered. Consequently, many such offenders should not have been sentenced
145. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958–59.
146. Id. at 958.
147. Id. at 960.
148. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993).
149. Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring).
150. The DSM notes that the typical onset of schizophrenia occurs between the late teens and
mid-thirties, but that late onset is also possible. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 102.
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to death in the first place because, at the least, mental abnormality should have
mitigated punishment at sentencing. Dementia associated with aging might be
a counter-example to the foregoing considerations, especially given the often
lengthy process before prisoners are actually executed. Again, however, let us
assume that the process was sufficiently fair.151
It is not clear whose interests are being protected by the bar on executing
incompetent offenders. Executing incompetent prisoners might seem to
support individual or state interests we endorse. For example, a prisoner
who does not fully apprehend what is happening might be less fearful. The
community might be indifferent to the mental state of the prisoner at the time
of the execution and satisfied both that the defendant deserved death for his
conduct at the time of the crime and that the state must fulfill its obligation to
impose that sentence. Professor Richard Bonnie, influenced by Justice Powell,
suggests that the only sound rationale for this bar is respect for the dignity
of the condemned prisoner, who has a right to be treated as a subject worthy
of respect and not simply as an object to vindicate the state’s promise.152 If
the offender does not realize what is happening to him, he will not be able to
exercise the few choices left to him that preserve his autonomy, agency, and
dignity.153 I have been persuaded by Professor Bonnie’s argument, but it does
leave open precisely how much rational understanding is necessary to vindicate
the condemned’s dignity. Because death is different, I would insist that a high
standard should be imposed. A just society should ensure that it substantially
increases the risk of error in favor of the prisoner.
RECOMMENDATION: The standard for competence to be executed
should be very high.
In Ford and Panetti, the Court did not hold that the decision about competence
to be executed must be made by a judge. Instead, and again following Justice
Powell’s Ford concurrence,154 it is apparently sufficient if there is some type of
impartial hearing officer or board who can receive arguments and evidence

151. I confess that I am deeply ambivalent about the issues in this section. I oppose capital
punishment and one part of me wants to make any argument possible to abolish it. Another
part, however, recognizes that it has constitutional status and I therefore try to make arguments
in light of that status.
152. Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human
Dignity, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 257, 277 (2007).
153. See id.
154. 477 U.S. 399, 425–27 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
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from the prisoner.155 Panetti made clear, however, that the offender is entitled to
use his own experts to rebut the state’s evidence.156
For a decision of such importance, only a judicial hearing is sufficient to
protect the prisoner’s rights. Any other type of decision-maker, especially if it is
an individual, will appear less formally rigorous or independent and will in fact
probably be less rigorous and independent. Moreover, the prisoner should be
entitled to the services of a genuinely independent mental-health practitioner
if the prisoner is too poor to hire his own. As a practical matter, advocates who
oppose capital punishment will surely ensure that such services are provided,
but it ought to be the prisoner’s right.
RECOMMENDATION: Competence to be executed should be decided by
a judicial hearing.
Suppose the concededly incompetent capital prisoner could potentially
be restored to competence by taking medically appropriate psychotropic
medication, but refuses to do so. The Supreme Court has not decided this
issue, but it has reached both a state supreme court, State v. Perry, which
decided that the prisoner could not be medicated unless the death penalty was
commuted,157 and a federal circuit court, Singleton v. Norris, which held that
the state’s interest was sufficiently strong to permit forcible medication.158 This
is a fearsomely difficult issue. In contrast to Harper,159 in this case the prisoner
must undergo not only the liberty deprivation of forcible medication, which is
not insignificant in itself, but also the ultimate deprivation of death as a result.
On the other hand, the meaning of a capital sentence is that society has decided
that the prisoner no longer has a right to live.
Singleton held that forcible medication would be permissible if the state had
a sufficiently strong interest, if the medication was the least intrusive way of
restoring competence, and if it was medically appropriate.160 Let us assume that
the state’s interest in imposing capital punishment is strong, as it surely is, and
that medication is necessary to restore competence, as it will be in most cases.
Dementia may again be a counter-example because there may be no treatment
that can restore competence in advanced cases. The issue is how to think about
whether the medication is medically appropriate. Therapy of the disorder may
155. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949–50 (2007).
156. Id. at 950, 958 (requiring that the prisoner must be able to offer his own psychiatric
testimony as a counterweight to the state’s evidence).
157. 610 So. 2d 746, 770 (La. 1992).
158. 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003).
159. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
160. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1027.
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alleviate it, but if so, it will enable execution. As a result, it is claimed that it is not
in the prisoner’s medical interest to be medicated so that he may be killed.161
With respect, the petitioner’s undoubted interest in continuing his life is a
moral and legal issue independent of his medical interests. His medical interest
is in alleviating serious illness. His personal interest in remaining alive is the
same legal interest any citizen has in life, except that in this case, it is forfeited. An
analogy may help make this clearer. Suppose the condemned prisoner suffers
from an illness that can cause loss of contact with reality or other dementia-like
states and suffering. Suppose, too, that medication to control the disorder can
cease to be fully effective unless the dosage is increased. If the prisoner’s illness
became uncontrolled as execution neared and he lost touch with reality and
was suffering, it would be medically inappropriate not to treat the defendant.
Or suppose the prisoner suffered a stroke and was in a coma in the emergency
room. Should the doctors fail to treat? I suggest that all physicians would believe
it is their duty to treat the prisoner. These cases can be distinguished, of course,
but is there a distinction that makes a principled difference, or is the desire to
avoid capital punishment at all costs driving the argument?
In Washington v. Glucksberg,162 the Court rejected the argument that people
have a due process right to physician-assisted suicide. In the course of reaching
that decision, the Court noted the state’s interest in upholding the ethics of the
medical profession as one ground for affirming the state’s constitutional right
to ban this practice.163 Almost certainly the overwhelming majority of American
physicians would probably oppose forcible psychotropic medication to restore
trial competence unless the death penalty was commuted. Surely, however,
there are a few physicians who do not oppose it and who would administer the
medication either because they do not think it is wrong or because they think it
is their distasteful duty, but a duty nonetheless if they work for the state.164 In a
sense, this case is the reverse of Glucksberg. There, the patient wanted treatment
that most doctors oppose.165 Here, the prisoner does not want treatment
that most doctors think it is wrong to impose unless capital punishment is
commuted. Nonetheless, the Court might uphold banning forcible medication
on the ground that permitting it undermines medical ethics. States will
certainly have the right to ban the practice of forcible medication to restore
161. See id. at 1025–27.
162. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
163. Id. at 731.
164. A state could surely permit an employee without a medical degree but with the proper
training to administer the drugs.
165. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
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execution competence, even if the Supreme Court ultimately decides that the
Constitution does not absolutely prohibit it.
If the Supreme Court does permit this practice, a particularly difficult
question is whether, when an execution date is set, competence flowing from
medication justified by Harper166 should be sufficient to let execution proceed.
This would permit the state to avoid the harder issue presented by using forcible
medication solely to restore competence to be executed. The prisoner may
continue to be a threat to his own safety or the safety of others. Nonetheless, the
prisoner on death row can probably be managed without medication because
the circumstances are very different from those of prisoners in the general
population. I propose that as the execution date approaches, the medication
should be reduced or withdrawn to determine if the prisoner is rendered
incompetent to be executed. If so, then the state must confront directly whether
it is willing to medicate this prisoner solely for the purpose of executing him.
The state should be forced to decide this rather than to be permitted to comfort
itself with an independent rationale that is much less problematic. It is not
enough to demonstrate that the Harper medication is genuinely independently
motivated and justified, and that competence restoration is simply a side
benefit. It might be argued that because the prisoner’s life is already forfeited,
society owes no such obligation to set up potential roadblocks that compel
the state to clear-sighted recognition of the immensity of its proposed action.
Perhaps so, but a civilized society should demand this.
RECOMMENDATION: Competence to be executed that is achieved
by forcible medication administered under a Harper rationale should not
be sufficient. The state should be compelled to decide whether forcible
medication solely to restore competence is justifiable independent of a
Harper rationale.
In conclusion, resolving in general and in individual cases the immensely
difficult issues presented by incompetence to be executed is another one of
the many costs and controversies capital punishment produces that abolition
would avoid.
L. MENTALLY ABNORMAL SEXUAL-PREDATOR COMMITMENT
A substantial minority of states have adopted a special form of involuntary
civil commitment if four criteria are met: a charge or conviction of a sexual
offense, the presence of a mental abnormality or a personality disorder,
predicted future dangerousness, and serious difficulty controlling the sexually
166.

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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violent conduct. Although civil, these forms of commitment are usually
accorded heightened procedural due process by legislation, such as the necessity
of proving the criteria beyond a reasonable doubt. They may be imposed at the
end of a full prison term for the sexual crime of conviction, and the term of
confinement is indefinite but includes periodic review.
In Kansas v. Hendricks,167 the Supreme Court upheld this type of
commitment against a claim that it violated substantive due process. The
Court noted that the requirement of a mental abnormality satisfied a classic
due process justification for civil commitment because it indicated that the
subject could not control his offending sexual behavior.168 Thus, for this and
other reasons, the Court held that the commitment was genuinely civil and not
criminal punishment.169 Just five years later, in Kansas v. Crane, the Court again
addressed the criteria for these commitments to decide whether the justifying
rationale of lack of control had to be proven independently.170 The Court held
that it did, but noted that the presence of a mental abnormality did not have
to render the defendant completely unable to control his conduct.171 Justice
Breyer wrote for the majority:
[W]e did not give to the phrase “lack of control” a particularly
narrow or technical meaning. And we recognized that in cases where
lack of control is at issue, “inability to control behavior” will not be
demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that
there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.
And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the
nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental
abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous
sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.172
Sexual predators fall into the gap between criminal and civil confinement
that desert-disease jurisprudence creates. Sexual offenders are routinely held
fully responsible and blameworthy for their behavior because they almost
always retain substantial capacity for rationality, they remain in touch with
167. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
168. Id. at 360.
169. Id. at 365–66. The statutes provide that these commitments may be triggered simply by a
charge of a sexual offense or incompetence to stand trial for such an offense, but in practice they
are imposed post-conviction and sentence.
170. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
171. Id. at 411–12.
172. Id. at 413.
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reality, and they know the applicable moral and legal rules. Consequently,
even if their sexual violence is in part caused by a mental abnormality, they
do not meet the usual standards for an insanity defense.173 For the same
reason, they do not meet the usual and implicit non-responsibility standards
for civil commitment and could not be restrained civilly after they finish a
prison term.174 In other words, their rationality and control capacities do not
indicate that they are sufficiently non-responsible to justify the preventive
detention involuntary civil commitment imposes. Moreover, in most cases in
which civil commitment is justified, a majority of states no longer maintain
routine indefinite involuntary civil commitment but instead tend to limit
the permissible length of commitment. Without these special forms of
commitment, most “sexual predators” could not be preventively detained at
the end of their prison term unless they committed a new crime.
I have frequently and severely criticized the statutes authorizing allegedly
civil commitment for sexual predators and both Hendricks and Crane.175 My
argument is that the gap-filling is impermissible because the mental-abnormality
criterion the Court approved is not a definition of abnormality and the control
criterion is vague and cannot be put into operation. Together these two criteria
do not entail that the agent is non-responsible. The differential responsibility
requirement for criminal conviction and civil sexual-predator commitment
is unjustified, and adequate prediction does not exist. Moreover, in practice,
these commitments do not offer treatment programs designed to let the inmate
progress and eventually be released. In Minnesota, for example, as of 2015, there
was no genuine treatment program and no one had ever been released.176

173. Consider the remarks of Justice Owen Dixon of Australia in King v. Porter (1933) 55
C.L.R. 182, 187:
[A] great number of people who come into a Criminal Court are abnormal. They
would not be there if they were the normal type of average everyday people.
Many of them are very peculiar in their dispositions and peculiarly tempered.
That is markedly the case in sexual offences. Nevertheless, they are mentally quite
able to appreciate what they are doing and quite able to appreciate the threatened
punishment of the law and the wrongness of their acts, and they are held in check
by the prospect of punishment.
174. The implicit non-responsibility standard is the lack of rational (or control) capacity. It
is the most general rationale for why some people with mental disorder are treated specially by
the law. Moreover, professionals do not prefer to treat dangerous people who are not obviously
suffering from a major disorder.
175. E.g., Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y & L. 250
(1998); Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1025 (2002).
176. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1146 (D. Minn. 2015).

316

Reforming Criminal Justice

Rather than repeat the arguments I’ve made in other writings, I will simply
say that the criteria in the Kansas statute that help establish non-responsibility,
personality disorder, and mental abnormality, are over-inclusive, and the
definition of mental abnormality is both obscure and virtually incoherent.
The causal link standard that ties abnormality to loss of control is not a nonresponsibility standard. The criteria for these commitments cannot conceivably
limit them only to those potential predators who cannot control themselves
and are, thus, not responsible for their potential sexual violence. Using such
criteria, virtually every predator would be both convictable and committable.
Even if one accepted independent, functional non-responsibility criteria,
however, serious control difficulty still fares poorly as a non-responsibility
standard because it is so poorly understood and cannot be adequately put into
operation. This standard is an invitation for conclusory, morally grounded
expert opinions offered as if they were based on sound scientific or clinical
standards and measurements, but they are not. Justice Breyer’s suggestion that
considering the nature of the diagnosis or the severity of the disorder will aid
decision-makers will not help if the abnormality criterion has no meaning and
if there is no necessary relation between these factors and lack of control.177
Once again, lack of control must be proved independently.
The criminal justice system is the appropriate mechanism for control of
responsible predators. Agents who are not responsible for their predatory sexual
violence may properly be confined involuntarily, but such a massive deprivation
of liberty should be inflicted only on those predators who are genuinely
not responsible. Even if a state seems to impose a genuinely independent,
serious-lack-of-control problem criterion, as Crane requires, the definition
of such a problem is so inevitably amorphous that this criterion will impose
no practical limit on abnormal sexual-predator commitments.178 Mental177. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
178. In his dissent in Crane, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for the vagueness of the
control standard it adopted. He conceded that the mental abnormality or personality disorder
criterion and the resulting propensity for violence criterion were both coherent and, with the
assistance of expert testimony, within the capacity of a normal jury to determine. But he chided
the majority’s control standard as being so vague that it will give trial judges “not a clue” about
how to charge juries. Id. at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He speculated that the majority offered
no further elaboration because “elaboration ... which passes the laugh test is impossible.” Id.
Justice Scalia wondered whether the test was a quantitative measure of loss-of-control capacity
or of how frequently the inability to control arises. In the alternative, he questioned whether the
standard was “adverbial,” a descriptive characterization of the inability to control one’s penchant
for sexual violence. Id. at 424. The adverbs he used as examples were “appreciably,” “moderately,”
“substantially,” and “almost totally.” Id. According to Justice Scalia, none of these could provide
any guidance. He was correct.
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health professionals will have no difficulty adjusting their expert testimony to
support the conclusion that virtually any sexually violent offender meets the
serious-lack-of-control standard. Moreover, there is nothing in the language of
Hendricks and Crane that would permit an appellate judge to overturn a jury
verdict of serious loss of control, except, perhaps, in extreme, obvious cases.179
Loss of control as an independent non-responsibility condition simply will not
suffice on conceptual, scientific, and practical grounds.
Note that the standards for non-responsibility differ in the criminal and
civil justice systems because the sexual predator is responsible for his sexual
crimes but sufficiently non-responsible to warrant involuntary commitment
based on the same behavior. It is paradoxical, to say the least, to claim that
a sexually violent predator is sufficiently responsible to deserve the stigma
and punishment of criminal incarceration, but that the predator is not
sufficiently responsible to be permitted the usual freedom from involuntary
civil commitment that even very predictably dangerous but responsible agents
retain because we wish to maximize the liberty and dignity of all citizens. But
Leroy Hendricks and Michael Crane had no realistic chance of succeeding with
an insanity defense. Even if the standards for responsibility in the two systems
need not be symmetrical, it is difficult to imagine what adequate conception
of justice would justify blaming and punishing an agent too irresponsible to
be left at large. An agent responsible enough to warrant criminal punishment
is sufficiently responsible to avoid preventive detention. If a state seriously
believes that any mental disability sufficiently compromises responsibility to
warrant civil preventive detention, then such disability should be part of the
criteria for the insanity defense. When a defendant is charged with an offense,
it is an occasion when the citizen has the most to lose and therefore deserves
the most consideration.
Finally, we have previously considered the difficulties with predictive
accuracy concerning future behavior. There are actuarial techniques for
evaluating the risk of future sexual predation, but none has better than

179. Such cases would probably be marked by an alleged predator’s history that is entirely
inconsistent with a colloquial control problem and by patently deficient expert testimony. I assume,
however, that such cases would be rare, especially if there were a history of sexual predation.
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modest success180 and clinical predictions, which will be used all too often,
are notoriously unreliable.181 A sexual-predator commitment is potentially
for life. The context in which the prediction will be made is a maximumsecurity institution in which the subject has been incarcerated: first prison
and then a secure hospital. The context of validation is the community. It will
be difficult to predict community behavior accurately based on behavior in
maximum security. Moreover, gatekeepers, including the state mental-health
professionals who evaluate the alleged predator, will have a natural incentive
to be conservative. The subjects are sexual criminals and thus not sympathetic
people. It will seem better, and safer, from the evaluator’s career standpoint, to
err on the side of caution than to err by releasing someone who may commit
a heinous crime. Although Ake does not require the provision of a mentalhealth professional in the civil context,182 the state should provide the potential
subject of a sexual-predator commitment with an independent expert to help
him challenge the state’s case.
RECOMMENDATION: The state should provide an independent mentalhealth professional to help indigent people subject to a mentally abnormal
sexual-predator commitment oppose the commitment.
Constitutional limitations on the state’s power to confine citizens based
on our concern for liberty inevitably mean that the protection of social safety
cannot be seamless and that security will be compromised. Some dangerous
but responsible agents must remain free until they commit a crime or until they
become non-responsible for their potential danger. As a result, our justifiable,
appropriate fear of the harms such people may cause creates strong incentives
to devise means to confine them preventively. Pure preventive detention on
grounds of dangerousness alone is inconsistent with a free society, however,
and we should not loosen the standards of non-responsibility to sweep
into civil confinement responsible agents who should more appropriately
be incapacitated by criminal sentences. As Justice Kennedy warned in his
concurrence in Hendricks, and as all the Justices in Crane apparently agreed,
180. See Dana Anderson & R. Karl Hanson, Static-99: An Actuarial Tool to Assess Risk of Sexual
and Violent Recidivism Among Sexual Offenders, in Handbook of Violence Risk Assessment
251, 255–260, 262 (Randy K. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds., 2010) (reviewing the most widely
used sexual recidivism instrument and finding an average “medium to large” effect size by
conventional standards, but noting that absolute recidivism rates are unknown and that there
is large variability in the effect size among the studies, and recommending caution in cases in
which accurate probability estimates are needed).
181. See Skeem & Monahan, supra note 137.
182. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (applying the right to the assistance of a mental
health professional in the criminal justice process).

Mental Disorder and Criminal Justice

319

civil commitment should not be used to impose punishment or to avoid the
effects of deficiencies in the criminal justice system, such as shortsighted plea
bargains, which might cause the legally required but objectionably early release
of dangerous criminals.183 I and most other academic commentators believe,
however, that this is precisely the motivation for sexual-predator commitments.
They are a way of filling the desert-disease gap using punishment by other
means, and they should be abolished.
RECOMMENDATION: Mentally abnormal sexual-predator commitment
laws should be repealed.
States could, of course, achieve essentially indefinite confinement through
the criminal justice system by imposing life sentences on sexual offenders.
Almost certainly, there would be no constitutional objection under current
proportionality jurisprudence,184 and many would accept that such sentences
would be deserved. Thus, perhaps we should not worry about the potentially
extensive reach of various control criteria for the civil commitment of sexual
predators because sexually violent offenders will remain incarcerated for
very long periods in any case. But this would be an unacceptably skeptical,
consequential approach to the danger sexual predation presents.185 The law
sets moral standards and should be clear about which agents are responsible.
Moreover, if sexual dangerousness were treated virtually exclusively within the
criminal justice system, legislators would be forced to confront and to defend
the sentences they are willing to impose on sexual offenders, rather than
sweeping this morally fraught question under the psychiatric rug.186 Finally,
prosecutors would be forced to straightforwardly evaluate the strength of their
cases and would not be able to rely on allegedly civil commitment to remedy
the effects of weak cases or shortsighted plea bargains.

183. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Indeed, Crane himself was sentenced to a relatively brief term of imprisonment as
a result of a plea bargain under circumstances that might otherwise have justified a prison term
of 35 years to life. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 287 (Kan. 2000).
184. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
contains only a narrow proportionality principle applied to term-of-years sentences).
185. This objection also bears a stunning resemblance to past claims that the insanity defense
should be abolished because defendants acquitted by reason of insanity are incarcerated in any
case. See Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the “Insanity Defense”—Why Not?, 72 Yale L.J.
853, 864–70 (1963). These claims were misguided for the same reasons that it is important to
distinguish responsible from non-responsible sexual predators.
186. Cf. Robert Weisberg, “Sexual Offenses,” in the present Volume; Wayne A. Logan, “Sex
Offender Registration and Notification,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
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M. COMMITMENT AFTER ACQUITTAL BY REASON OF INSANITY

In all jurisdictions, a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity may be
automatically civilly committed, either for an evaluation that will be followed
by formal civil commitment, or by formal commitment itself without a prior
evaluation.187 Although not punishment for crime—the defendant has been
acquitted after all—these civil commitments have been justified because the
defendant is allegedly still dangerous and not responsible for the dangerousness.
The terms of such possible commitments vary across jurisdictions, but in some
jurisdictions the term may be indefinite with periodic review. In Jones v. United
States,188 the Supreme Court upheld both an automatic commitment for
evaluation and the potentially indefinite commitment of a defendant acquitted
by reason of insanity for shoplifting a leather jacket. The Court argued that,
based on an insanity acquittal, it is rational to presume that the subject was
still mentally disordered and dangerous.189 The Court was unwilling to equate
“dangerousness” with violence. It claimed that the legislative purpose to
confine was the same for nonviolent and violent offenses and that the former
often led to the latter.190 Moreover, for this type of commitment, the Court
was willing to accept a lesser burden of persuasion than “clear and convincing
evidence,” which is the constitutionally imposed standard for other forms
of civil commitment.191 Post-insanity commitments are different, the Court
claimed, because the defendant himself raised the issue of mental disorder,
and so the risk of error is decreased.192 Finally, the Court approved potentially
indefinite confinement on the ground that such confinement did bear a rational
relation to the purpose of the commitment, which is to confine dangerous,
non-responsible agents. The defendant was acquitted, so the length of the
confinement need not be limited by the deserved punishment. The subject is
properly confined as long as the defendant remains disordered and dangerous
and need not be released until either condition is no longer met. This might

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See Parry, supra note 38, at 168–70.
463 U.S. 354 (1983).
Id. at 365.
See id. at 365 n.14.
Id. at 367–68; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–33 (1979).
Jones, 463 U.S. at 367.
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happen at any time, or never.193 In Foucha v. Louisiana,194 the Court affirmed
that a post-insanity commitment must end if the subject is no longer mentally
ill, even if he is still dangerous.195
I think that the Court was correct to decouple the potential length of the
civil commitment from the sentence for the crime charged. The defendant has
been acquitted and the usual justifications for a sentence length do not apply.
Roughly, the legislature sets sentences that are proportionate to culpability
and that reflect an ordinary, rational offender’s dangerousness. The insanity
acquittee is neither culpable nor dangerous in the ordinary manner, however.
If the basis for the commitment is non-responsible dangerousness, the
commitment can justifiably continue until these conditions are no longer met.
Although this is true as a theoretical matter, it seems useless to have lengthy
commitments for nonviolent offenders. They do not present much danger and
193. Id. at 368–69.
194. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
195. Id. at 81. Justice O’Connor partially concurred. She noted that an insanity acquittee had
been found to have committed the prima facie case beyond a reasonable doubt. She then wrote
cryptically, as follows:
It might therefore be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee
who has regained sanity if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and
duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns
related to the acquittee’s continuing dangerousness.… [A]cquittees could not
be confined as mental patients absent some medical justification for doing so;
in such a case the necessary connection between the nature and purposes of
confinement would be absent.
Id. at 87–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In addition, Justice O’Connor noted that the seriousness
of the crime should also affect whether the state’s interest in continued confinement would be
strong enough. See id. at 88.
If the subject is no longer mentally disordered and therefore no longer non-responsible, it
is hard to imagine what possible “medical justification” there could be for continuing civil
commitment to protect the public. It is not clear from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence if she would
require some finding of mental abnormality—as did the statute upheld in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 355 (1997)—to make the commitment analogous to traditional civil commitment. If not,
however, then five Justices of the Supreme Court, the four Foucha dissenters and Justice O’Connor,
would have been willing to countenance pure preventive detention, at least of a person who had
committed a crime without being responsible and who continued to be dangerous.
For an attempt to apply Justice O’Connor’s suggestion, see State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94,
109 (Wis. 1995) (permitting continued confinement if there were a medical justification and
the subject was still dangerous, but limiting the term to the maximum sentence for the crime
charged). Needless to say, I believe that this practice is simply criminal punishment by other
means. The “medical justification” criterion is a transparent and fraudulent attempt to bring this
type of commitment within the disease justification for preemptive confinement. The limitation
on the term of the commitment to the maximum term for the crime charged is simply a salve to
the legislative conscience and a signal that the continued commitment is punitive.
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the risk that they will be erroneously held longer than necessary is substantial.
I would have limited terms of confinement for non-violent acquittees. These
could be longer than ordinary involuntary civil commitment terms because the
acquittee was prima facie guilty of a criminal offense, which is seldom the case
in involuntary civil commitment and never required.196 Nonetheless, the terms
of post-insanity commitment for nonviolent offenders should be short. If the
subject has a clean disciplinary record in the hospital, he should be released
at the end of the short term or the state can seek ordinary involuntary civil
commitment. Another possibility is conditional or probationary release.197 If
the acquittee has an unproblematic probationary period in the community,
the commitment should end. In short, the principle of least restrictive means
should be applied to the treatment of insanity acquittees.
RECOMMENDATION: Post-insanity acquittal commitments should
be subject to the least-restrictive-means principle, including compelled
treatment in the community.
The Court in Jones never noted that the mental disorder and dangerousness
had to be linked to ensure that the subject was not responsible for his
dangerousness.198 After all, non-responsibility for the legally relevant behavior,
in this case dangerousness, is necessary to justify involuntary commitment. It
is possible for a person to be independently disordered and bad, with no link
between them that suggests that the defendant’s dangerousness is irrational.
For example, a paranoid defendant may have an excuse if he attacks another
because he delusionally believes that the victim is a wrongful assailant, but
there will be no excuse if he robs a bank. There probably will be such a link in
most cases of insanity acquittal, but it cannot be taken for granted empirically.
196. See Parry, supra note 38, at 476–77 (discussing the criteria for commitments for
dangerousness, which do not include a finding of prima facie guilt for a criminal offense or the
equivalent thereof). Parry notes that the trend in standard involuntary civil commitments for
dangerousness is away from requiring overt, recent acts and threats and towards more purely
predictive criteria. In practice, however, commitment is common for threatening behavior,
including verbal threats. Less serious assaults and thefts may also lead to civil commitment,
although they are often processed through the criminal justice system. In my experience,
seriously violent conduct is virtually always processed through the criminal justice system.
Moreover, traditional civil commitment requires only the lower, clear and convincing burden of
persuasion. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–33 (1979).
197. See Cal. Penal Code § 1026.2(e)–(f).
198. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363–65 (1983) (discussing the need for a showing of
both mental disorder and dangerousness to justify these commitments and apparently assuming
that the fact of an insanity acquittal supplies a link between the two criteria, but not explicitly
requiring the causal link at the time of commitment).
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More important, there is reason to doubt the Court’s presumption of
continuing mental disorder and dangerousness. By definition, the defendant
must have been sufficiently rational to be competent to stand trial. If that
state of rational capacity continues, then it is not clear that he continues to
be mentally ill for the purpose of involuntary commitment. Moreover, to the
extent that the mental disorder played a causal role in the practical reasoning
that accompanied the offense, it is perfectly possible that the defendant is no
longer dangerous either. This will be especially possible if the prosecution
bears the burden of persuasion on legal insanity and the defendant needs only
to cast a reasonable doubt about his sanity. Even if the defendant bears the
burden of persuasion, as is commonly the case at present, the considerations
just mentioned apply.
My suggestion, therefore, is that all post-acquittal commitments should
be for evaluation only and should not be for full commitment. There is little
need to deprive the defendant of more liberty to protect the public. Preventive
commitment should occur only if the evaluation indicates that the criteria for
commitment are met at present. The evaluations need not last more than a few
weeks. That is more than sufficient for the state’s mental-health professionals
to reach a conclusion. I once again think that a subject facing potentially
indefinite commitment and those facing substantial limited terms should be
entitled to the services of an independent mental-health professional to help
defend against the commitment. Without such help, they have essentially
no chance if the state’s professional recommends commitment. These forms
of commitment are more onerous than ordinary involuntary commitment
and fairness requires that insanity acquittees should have a chance to avoid
long-term incarceration in secure forensic facilities. For the same reason,
the state should have to prove the commitment criteria by the higher, clear
and convincing standard that Addington imposed for ordinary involuntary
commitment to avoid imposing too much risk of error on the individual.199
RECOMMENDATION: An insanity acquittal should be followed by a brief
evaluation period rather than by involuntary commitment to determine if
the acquittee is still dangerous because his mental disorder continues. If the
state then wishes to commit the acquittee, there should be a judicial hearing
and the acquittee should have the right to an independent mental-health
professional to assist him to contest the commitment.

199.

Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–33.
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N. EXPERT TESTIMONY

In Section III.B, I suggested that all forensic evaluations should be
videotaped. This would have an immensely beneficial effect on determining
the accuracy of the evaluation for the reasons given above, not least of which
would be aiding cross-examination of the testifying evaluator, and I want to
repeat this recommendation.
There are two questions we should ask of mental-health expert opinions
and testimony. Is it clinically and scientifically sound, and is it genuinely
relevant to the legal question in issue? All too often, alas, expert testimony
does not meet these criteria. In particular, experts too often conflate mental
health and legal criteria. For example, a “broken” brain is not an excusing or
mitigating condition, per se, no matter how broken the brain appears to be.
Expert testimony on such matters is legally relevant only if the abnormality
produces acts and mental states that meet the legal criteria. The expert should
be able to show precisely—no hand-waving allowed—how the expert data help
answer the legal question. If it is not obviously directly relevant, the expert
should be able to show the chain of inference that establishes its relevance.
In particular, we should ask whether a diagnosis ever answers a legal
question independent of the underlying behavioral criteria (broadly defined as
in Section I of this chapter) upon which diagnosis is based. I submit that it does
not and it distracts the legal decision-maker and leads to question-begging
about responsibility and competence. In almost all contested cases, there will
be a conflict about the appropriate diagnosis. Rather than ask the decisionmaker to decide under which shell the diagnostic pea may be found, the experts
should testify only about the underlying behavior, which will be much easier
to assess than whether a specific diagnosis is warranted. Because all diagnostic
categories can be met by very heterogeneous behavior, the diagnosis indicates
nothing very specific about the defendant’s behavior, including whether the
defendant had self-control capacity. The underlying data are far more helpful.
Barring testimony about diagnosis is not the law anywhere, although
Congress did strongly consider imposing this limitation as part of the Insanity
Defense Reform Act. Nonetheless, it would be a salutary change because it
would produce greater clarity and it would not prevent experts from offering
data and opinions on the underlying data that are relevant. Moreover, when
decision-makers hear “disease terms,” they tend to think that responsibility or
competence is affected, but this is a mistake.
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In nearly all jurisdictions, experts are allowed to offer an opinion on the
“ultimate legal issue,” such as whether a defendant is competent or legally
insane. In federal criminal cases, however, the Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1984 bars experts from offering an ultimate opinion on whether the defendant
possessed the requisite mens rea for the crime charged or was legally insane.
In my opinion, the federal rule is correct and should be widely adopted and
expanded to include all ultimate-issue testimony. The ultimate issue is a legal
issue, and mental-health experts have no particular expertise about legal issues.
When they offer such opinions, they are doffing their white coats and simply
stepping into the jury box as the 13th lay juror. It is sufficient if they present
the underlying data relevant to the legal issue and let the judge or jury decide if
those data meet the standard in issue.
RECOMMENDATION: Expert witnesses at any stage of the criminal
justice process should be prohibited from offering an opinion on the
ultimate legal issue in question.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mental disorder plays a very large role in criminal justice at every step in the
process. Virtually all doctrines and practices would benefit from substantial
reforms to further justice, humanitarian and systemic goals. This chapter has
made an enormous number of recommendations. I hope that some begin
serious discussion and come to fruition. Most importantly, however, better
mental-health services, including addiction treatment, should be more widely
available in the community and in the criminal justice system.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To reiterate, here are my policy recommendations to promote greater justice
and humanity in the law’s treatment of criminal offenders who suffer from
mental disorders.
1.

Readers interested in the role of mental disorder in the criminal justice system
should also consult the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards.

2.

When predicting future behavior, the most accurate type of prediction
method available should be used. If actuarial or structured clinical
judgment methods are available for the type of prediction in question,
they should always be preferred to purely clinical prediction.

3.

Race should not be considered as a variable when predicting future behavior.

4.

Non-physician health-care providers in jails and prisons, especially
psychologists, psychiatric social workers, and psychiatric nurses, who have
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received adequate training in prescribing psychotropic medication should
be permitted to prescribe psychotropic medication and medication for
substance use disorders.

5.

Until rigorous data support the effectiveness of various psychological
treatment methods for prisoners, including special populations such as
addicts and sexual offenders, large-scale resource allocation for such methods
should be limited, especially for methods focused on individual cases.

6.

Jail and prison mental-health services need to be dramatically improved.

7.

Mentally disordered people arrested for nonviolent or minimally violent
offenses should be diverted from the criminal justice system to the mentalhealth system. Adequate methods for effective and efficient triggering of
diversion must be devised, and adequate treatment must be provided in
the community to the people diverted. Law-enforcement officers should
receive special training in dealing with mentally disordered people to
enhance diversion and to deal with such people humanely.

8.

Competence determinations should be fully adversarial, with experts
representing both sides.

9.

A mental-health expert should be appointed to assist a defendant with
any potential claim based on mental disorder that bears on culpability
and punishment.

10. Defendants with a mental health-based claim should be entitled to
a genuinely independent mental-health expert of his own choosing
retained for the defense team, and the results of the evaluation should be
confidential work product and not disclosed to the prosecution unless the
defendant intends to use the evaluation to support a claim.
11. Clinical forensic evaluation interviews should be videotaped, and the raw
scores of psychological tests should be provided to the opposing side.
12. In quasi-criminal proceedings, such as those involving the civil
commitment of mentally abnormal, sexually violent predators, the
person facing commitment should be entitled to a genuinely independent
mental-health professional to assist him.
13. Defendants who are incompetent to stand trial should be permitted
without exception to raise pretrial motions that might end the prosecution.
14. Long-term inpatient commitments to restore trial competence are
unnecessary. Short-term commitments are adequate to either restore
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the defendant or to determine that the defendant cannot be restored. In
appropriate cases, restoration should be performed in the community.
15. Forcible medication to restore trial competence should be justified in the
case of all felony prosecutions.
16. The test for competence to plead guilty and to waive counsel should be a
context-dependent assessment of whether the defendant has the rational
skills necessary to meet a generally low standard for competence.
17. Defendants should be permitted to introduce evidence of mental disorder
without limitation to negate any subjective mens rea but should not be
permitted to use such evidence to negate negligence.
18. All jurisdictions should adopt a cognitive test for legal insanity but should
not adopt a control test.
19. All jurisdictions should adopt an insanity defense to ensure that justice is
done in appropriate cases and no alternative will equally achieve this result.
20. Legislatures should adopt a generic verdict of “guilty but partially
responsible” that would reduce the defendant’s sentence in cases in which
the defendant’s rationality was substantially compromised.
21. Prisoners should be forcibly medicated under a Harper rationale only if
the prisoner’s dangerousness is a result of his disordered state of mind.
22. Prisoners facing a Harper hearing should be represented by an adviser,
preferably an attorney, who is independent of the prison or mental-health
system in the jurisdiction.
23. In all capital and noncapital sentencing proceedings in which the
defendant has a colorable mitigation claim based on mental disorder,
the defendant should have the right to an independent mental-health
professional retained for the defense to assist him with the claim.
24. Legislatures should adopt a mandated scheme of mitigation if the
sentencing judge finds that substantial diminished rationality existed
at the time of the crime. The amount of reduction could be a uniform
percentage or might vary by crime to adjust for social-safety concerns,
but the sentencing judge should have no power to individualize beyond
the mandated reduction.
25. In noncapital cases, mental disorder may be used as an enhancement
factor but only if the most accurate methods of predicting future behavior
have been used and indicate a very substantial risk, but the amount of
enhancement should be limited.
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26. The standard for competence to be executed should be very high.
27. Competence to be executed should be decided by a judicial hearing.
28. Competence to be executed that is achieved by forcible medication
administered under a Harper rationale should not be sufficient. The state
should be compelled to decide whether forcible medication solely to
restore competence is justifiable independent of a Harper rationale.
29. The state should provide an independent mental-health professional to
help indigent people subject to a mentally abnormal sexual-predator
commitment oppose the commitment.
30. Mentally abnormal sexual-predator commitment laws should be repealed.
31. Post-insanity acquittal commitments should be subject to the least restrictive
means principle, including compelled treatment in the community.
32. An insanity acquittal should be followed by a brief evaluation period
rather than by involuntary commitment to determine if the acquittee is
still dangerous because his mental disorder continues. If the state then
wishes to commit the acquittee, there should be a judicial hearing and
the acquittee should have the right to an independent mental-health
professional to assist him to contest the commitment.
33. Expert witnesses at any stage of the criminal justice process should be
prohibited from offering an opinion on the ultimate legal issue in question.

